

1968/9

YEAR STAMP

FILE No. NE Q 3/548/1

SECRET

UNCLIDENTIAL

SECURITY GRADING

must be the same as that of the highest grade

grading slip must be affixed when ever necessary

CONFIDENTIAL

1968/9

YEAR STAMP

Contents checked for transfer to D.R.O.

(Sgd.) K.P. Osborne

Date 18/8/70

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

DEPT. NEAR EASTERN

(1-53)

FILE No. NE Q 3/548/1 (Part A.)

TITLE: Anglo/Iraqi Political Relations
BRITISH POLICY

REFER TO			REFER TO			REFER TO		
NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE
D.S.M.	(2)	6/12	P.H.		17/4			
Arabian	3	10/12	Reg.		21/5			
Arabian Reg.	3	11/12	P.H.		21/5			
D.S.M.	4/1	18/12	Reg.		31/8			
Reg.		20/12	P.H.		4/8			
D.S.M.		12/1						
Reg.		13/1						
D.S.M.		24/1						
FP & A D	3	27/1						
In Evans NED	Mm5	27/1						
Reg. B.U.		31/1						
P.R.M.H.		5/2						
Reg.		18/2						
P.H.		14/2						
Reg.		20/2						
Mr. Acland	(16)	24/2						
Reg.		11/3						
P.H.		11/3						
Reg.		15/4						

Registry Address

Room No. 115

E.O. Building,

Downing Street.

SECRET

UNCLIDENTIAL

1968/9

YEAR STAMP

DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

(NEQ 371)

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE,

LONDON, S.W.1.

12 November, 1968.

Sir,

British Policy towards Iraq

Your Excellency's Despatch No. 1/3 of the 27th of July giving your first impressions of Iraq and its new government, in which you also made a number of recommendations, has been studied with much interest in the Department and in Whitehall. It would have received an earlier reply had there not supervened the events of the 30th of July described in your Despatch of the 15th of August.

2. Your Despatch of the 27th of July gave a cautiously encouraging report of the favourable reaction in Iraq to the resumption of diplomatic relations, and of the reserve of goodwill towards Britain still existing, and recommended measures for the re-establishment of links in the cultural, military and technical assistance fields, as well as the development of personal exchanges. These recommendations provide an appropriate opportunity for the consideration of our future policy towards Iraq.

3. Your Despatch of the 27th of July analysed the failings of President Aref's régime, and the problems which faced it. Your predecessors, since 1958, in their despatches pointed to similar factors, and were often under the necessity of painting

/an

His Excellency

Mr. T.E. Evans, C.M.G., O.B.E.,
etc., etc., etc.,
Baghdad.

CONFIDENTIAL

an even darker picture only rarely introducing a pale ray of optimism. All the difficulties that faced the forerunners of the present Iraqi government are still there; the contradiction in foreign, as in domestic and economic policies, between what is popular - at any rate among the vocal in Iraq - and what is sensible; the stagnation of agriculture and development; the alienation from government of the commercial classes; the communal religious problem; the Kurdish question and the consequent shadow over relations with Iran; inter-Arab and intra-party disputes; the list is by no means exhaustive. Nor is there on the face of it any reason to suppose that the predominantly Ba'athist government of Hassan al Bakr will be markedly more successful than its predecessors in finding solutions, and getting the country moving forward again.

4. While it is encouraging that the present government appears anxious to establish itself on a basis broader than purely Ba'athist, the record shows that ever since its foundation the Ba'ath party has displayed an inability to compromise which has severely restricted its capacity for co-operating with other political groups. Moreover, the present government, like all recent Iraqi governments, will remain dependent on the support it can command in the army; and the Iraqi army, at any rate in the middle and junior ranks of the officer corps, which, to a great extent set the tone, has not shown itself either a force for moderate and sensible policies, or well disposed to British interests.

5. It is therefore against this somewhat discouraging background that we must assess the possibilities for Anglo/Iraqi relations. We must, I think, accept that as long as the present

/military

CONFIDENTIAL

Q military régime lasts, we are unlikely to have any reliable basis for political friendship with Iraq and that until there is a substantial change for the better, our ability to exert any political influence will be limited. We must hope that before too long there will come to power a new generation of Iraqis with a more objective and pragmatic outlook, more capable of acting in the true interests of Iraq, and for us easier to do business with.

6. In the meantime we must do what we can to protect and advance the very considerable British interests in Iraq. In the political field we shall remain concerned that Iraq should not be a force making for instability whether in the Persian Gulf, or as regards the Arab/Israel dispute, and should not serve as an instrument for Soviet policies. Commercially our interests are naturally to recover and, if possible, improve on the former level of British exports to Iraq, and above all to protect our oil interests which lie in the large British share in the British registered Iraq Petroleum Company. These last require more detailed consideration.

7. Your Excellency is aware of the company's difficulties with the Iraq government over the last ten years. Recently the chief of these have been the Iraq government's failure to ratify the abortive agreement of 1965, which would have settled all major issues in dispute, and its actions last year reinforcing earlier legislation expropriating most of the I.P.C.'s concession area and giving an active role to the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) in exploiting this expropriation, including

/the

the existing valuable oil field at North Rumaila. The I.P.C. seems now to have broadly acknowledged to itself that there is no chance of recovering anything like its original rights to North Rumaila, and is working for a settlement that would salvage whatever is possible from the expropriation and preserve the company's remaining assets in Iraq without prejudicing the shareholders' interests in other oil countries. A settlement would also be in Iraqi interests in that Iraq could then arrange for the exploration and development of the I.P.C.'s former concession area uninhibited by the threat of legal proceedings, and could also expect to benefit from the development by the I.P.C., in a more settled atmosphere, of the company's remaining oil resources.

8. The I.P.C. cannot see a clear way to a settlement but is approaching the problem with flexibility. For the time being intervention by Her Majesty's Government with the Iraq Government would probably be counter-productive. Her Majesty's Government would in any event normally only intervene in matters of this kind at the request of the company. While it is possible that circumstances might arise in which intervention by Her Majesty's Government could assist in promoting an agreement, or help to protect the I.P.C. from further encroachments, you should at the moment refrain from any initiatives, however informal, and be circumspect in discussing these matters if the Iraqis should raise them. In that event you should aim to confine yourself to ensuring that the I.P.C.'s basic case does not go by default, and to stressing that a mutually acceptable settlement would be in the interest both of the

/parties

parties, and of Anglo/Iraqi relations.

9. I should also like you to keep me closely informed of other developments in Iraq affecting our oil interests, such as the activities of INOC and the Iraqis' dealings with the foreign interests which are becoming increasingly active in seeking to benefit from the present situation. A particular point of interest, in the context of the Middle East generally as well as of Iraq, is the activity of the Soviet Union which, as you know, has already concluded with the Iraqis an agreement in principle to assist the latter in developing their oil resources.

10. Your Excellency's specific recommendations for improving our position in Iraq have been examined against the background sketched earlier in this Despatch, and also in relation to the current financial climate which compels a rigorously critical approach to proposals involving disbursement of public funds. They seem in general well suited to the circumstances. The conclusions, some of which are in process of being put into effect, are as follows:

(a) Arms Supply

We have had no occasion to refuse an export licence for military equipment since the resumption of relations. In examining any future requests for such licences, and general enquiries about our willingness to supply particular types of equipment, we shall have to take account of the principles which govern all our decisions about the supply of arms to countries in the Middle East.

/(b)

(b) Military Training

The Iraqis have in the past always been ready to pay for their training, and I do not think it would be right to provide training in the future at British expense.

(c) Service Attachés

We are ready to be as forthcoming as possible with the present Minister of Defence, but we have to remember that it was at Iraqi request that the Training Mission as well as the Service Attachés were summarily expelled in June 1967. As you know, your Defence Attaché, having received thorough training in industrial and other matters, is due to reach Baghdad this month.

(d) British Council

The return of the British Council was contingent on the approval of the Iraqi Government. Now that you have obtained this, the British Council will shortly be sending out two administrative staff, and are examining further proposals to resume operations.

(e) Reform of the Civil Service

I have misgivings about the wisdom of our offering any help in this field. The motive might be misconstrued and, even if an offer were accepted, the investment would probably be a risky one. There is the danger that the civil servants we had trained

/would

would be dismissed or transferred to unimportant functions. There is also the danger that we might at a later stage be accused of having tried to meddle in Iraqi internal affairs. I assume that in any case, Your Excellency would not wish the matter to go further unless the Iraqi government make a clear request for help.

(f) Technical Assistance

Your staff have been in correspondence with the Ministry of Overseas Development. We are in agreement with the Ministry's view, as expressed in Mr. McKenzie Johnston's letter MID 205/87/01 of the 28th of August, that the right course is to hasten slowly with a modest programme.

(g) Visits

We have already tried to persuade the Minister of Defence to visit Farnborough. The information budget for the current financial year makes no provision for other visits from Iraq; but modest sums could perhaps be made available if you should wish to recommend one or two visitors later this financial year. You will no doubt be making proposals in due course about possible visits next year.

/I am

CONFIDENTIAL

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Amman, Ankara, Beirut, Cairo, Jedda, Kuwait, Tehran, Tel Aviv and Washington, to the Political Resident Persian Gulf and to Her Majesty's Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your Excellency's obedient Servant,
(For the Secretary of State)

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry No. NEQ 3/1	<div style="text-align: right;">HC</div> DRAFT Despatch	<div style="text-align: right;">12/9.30.</div> Type 1 + 11
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Top Secret. Secret. <u>Confidential.</u> Restricted. Unclassified.	To:— H.E. Mr. T.E. Evans, C.M.G., O.B.E., Baghdad.	From Telephone No. & Ext. Department
PRIVACY MARKING _____ In Confidence	<div style="text-align: right;">Room 115 D.S. Ext 1350</div>	
<div style="text-align: right;">copies 2 ent.</div>	<div style="text-align: center;"> <u>British Policy towards Iraq</u> </div> <p> Your Excellency's Despatch No.1/3 of the 27th of July giving your first impressions of Iraq and its new government, in which you also made a number of recommendations, has been studied with much interest in the Department and in Whitehall. It would have received an earlier reply had there not supervened the events of the 30th of July described in your Despatch of the 15th of August. </p> <p> 2. Your Excellency's Despatch of the 27th of July gave a cautiously encouraging report of the favourable reaction in Iraq to the resumption of diplomatic relations, and of the reserve of goodwill towards Britain still existing in Iraq, and recommended measures for the re-establishment of links in the cultural, military and technical assistance fields, as well as the development of personal exchanges. These recommendations provide an appropriate opportunity for the consideration of our future policy towards Iraq. </p> <p> 3. Your Despatch of the 27th of July </p> <div style="text-align: right;">/analysed...</div>	

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

analysed the failings of President Aref's régime, and the problems which face it. Your predecessors, since 1958, ~~have~~ in their despatches pointed to similar factors, and were often under the necessity of painting ^{AN} ~~a~~ ^{on even} darker picture, only rarely introducing a pale ray of optimism. All the difficulties that faced the forerunners of the present Iraqi government are still there; the contradiction in foreign, as in domestic and economic policies, between what is popular - at any rate among the vocal in Iraq - and what is sensible; the stagnation of agriculture and development; the alienation from government of the commercial classes; the communal religious problem; the Kurdish question and the consequent shadow over relations with Iran; inter-Arab and intra-party disputes; the list is by no means exhaustive. Nor is there on the face of it any reason to suppose that the predominantly Ba'athist government of Hassan al Bakr will be markedly more successful than its predecessors in finding solutions, and getting the country moving forward again.

3. While it is encouraging that the present government appears anxious to establish itself on a basis broader than purely Ba'athist, the record shows that ever since its foundation the Ba'ath party has displayed an inability to compromise which has severely restricted its

/capacity..

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

capacity for co-operating with other political groups. Moreover, the present government, like all recent Iraqi governments, will remain dependent on the support it can command in the army; and the Iraqi army, at any rate in the middle and junior ranks of the officer corps, which, to a great extent set the tone, has not shown itself either a force for moderate and sensible policies, or well disposed to British interests.

4. It is therefore against this somewhat discouraging background that we must assess the possibilities ^{for} ~~in~~ Anglo/Iraqi relations. We must, I think, accept ^{that} ~~as~~ long as the present military régime lasts, ~~that~~ we are unlikely to have any reliable basis for political friendship with Iraq and ~~must recognise~~ that until there is a substantial change for the better, our ability to exert any political influence will be limited. We must hope that before too long there will come to power a new generation of Iraqis with a more objective and pragmatic outlook, more capable of acting in the true interests of Iraq, and for us easier to do business with.

5. In the meantime we must do what we can to protect and advance the very considerable British interests in Iraq. In the political field we ^{shall} ~~must~~ remain concerned that Iraq should not be a force making for instability whether in the Persian Gulf, or as regards the

/Arab/Israel

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Arab/Israel dispute, and should not serve as an instrument for Soviet policies.

Commercially our interests are naturally to recover and, if possible, improve on the former level of British exports to Iraq, and above all to protect our oil interests which lie in the large British share in the British registered Iraq Petroleum Company. These last require more detailed consideration.

6. Your Excellency is aware of the company's difficulties with the Iraq government over the last ten years. ^{Recently} The chief of these have been the Iraq government's failure to ratify the abortive agreement of 1965, which would have

settled all major issues in dispute, and its ~~acting last year reinforcing earlier legislation expropriating~~ ^{expropriation last year of most of the IPC's} ~~most of the IPC's concession area and giving an active~~ ^{concession area including the valuable field} ~~role to the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) in exploring this~~ ^{at North Rumaila} The IPC ~~has~~ ^{seems} now accepted

that there is no chance of recovering ^{anything like} its original rights to North Rumaila, and is now working for a

settlement that would preserve the company's ^{remaining} present assets in Iraq without prejudicing the shareholders' interests ^{in other oil countries.} elsewhere. A

settlement would also be in Iraqi interests in that ^{Iraq} they could then arrange for the exploration and development of the IPC's former concession area uninhibited by the threat of legal proceedings, and could also expect to benefit from the development by the IPC, in a more settled atmosphere, of the company's remaining oil resources.

expropriation, including the existing valuable oil field at North Rumaila.

to have broadly acknowledged to itself

salvage matter is possible from the expropriation and

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

7. The IPC cannot see a clear way to a settlement but is approaching the problem with ~~commendable~~ ^{flexible} flexibility. For the time being intervention by H.M.G. ^{with the Iraqi Government} would probably be counter-productive. H.M.G. would in any event normally only intervene in matters of this kind at the request of the company. While it is possible that circumstances might arise in which intervention by H.M.G. could assist in promoting an agreement, or ~~the~~ help ~~the~~ to protect the IPC from further encroachments, you should at the moment refrain from any initiatives, however informal, and be circumspect in discussing these matters if the Iraqis should raise them. In that event you should aim to confine yourself to ensuring that the IPC's basic case does not go by default, and to stressing that a mutually acceptable settlement would be in the interest both of the parties, and ^{of} Anglo/Iraqi relations.

8. I should also like you to keep me closely informed of other developments in Iraq affecting our oil interests, such as the activities of INOC ^{and} and the Iraqis' dealings with the foreign interests which are becoming increasingly active in seeking ~~opportunities~~ to benefit from the present situation. A particular point of interest, in the context of the Middle East generally as well as of Iraq, is the activity of the Soviet Union which, as you know, has already concluded with the Iraqis an agreement in principle to assist the latter in developing ^{their}...

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

They seem
in general
well suited
to the
circumstances

their oil resources.

9. Your Excellency's specific recommendations for improving our position in Iraq have been examined against the background sketched earlier in this Despatch, and also in relation to the current financial climate which compels a rigorously critical approach to proposals involving disbursement of public funds.

The conclusions, some of which are in process of being put into effect, are as follows:

(a) Arms Supply

We have had no occasion to refuse an export licence for military equipment since the resumption of relations. In examining any future requests for such licences, and general enquiries about our willingness to supply particular types of equipment, we shall have to take account of the principles which govern all our decisions about the supply of arms to countries in the Middle East.

(b) Military Training

The Iraqis have in the past always been ready to pay for their training, and ~~we~~ ^I do not think it would be right to provide training in the future at British expense.

(c) Service Attachés

We are ~~anxious~~ ^{ready} to be as forthcoming as possible with the present Minister of Defence, but we have to remember that it

/was....

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

was at Iraqi request that ^{as well as} the Service
 Attachés ^{and} Training Mission/were
^{the}

summarily expelled in June 1967. As
 you know, your Defence Attaché, having
 received thorough training in industrial
 and other matters, is due to reach
^{this month}
 Baghdad ~~in November~~.

(d) British Council

The return of the British Council
 was contingent on the approval of the
 Iraqi Government. Now that you have
 obtained this, the British Council will
 shortly be sending out two administrative
 staff, and are examining further
 proposals to resume operations.

(e) Reform of the Civil Service

^I
~~We~~ have misgivings about the wisdom
 of our offering any help in this field.
 The motive might be misconstrued and,
 even if an offer ^{were} ~~was~~ accepted, the
 investment would probably be a risky one.
 There is the danger that the civil
 servants we had trained would be dismissed
 or transferred to unimportant functions.
 There is also the danger that we might
 at a later stage be accused of having
 tried to meddle in Iraqi internal
 affairs. ^I
~~We~~ assume that in any case,
 you would not wish the matter to go
^{any}
 further ~~until~~ the Iraqi government ~~has~~
^{has}
 made a clear request for help.

/(f)....

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

(f) Technical Assistance

Your staff have been in correspondence with the Ministry of Overseas Development. We are in agreement with the Ministry's view, as expressed in Mr. McKenzie Johnston's letter MID 205/87/01 of the 28th of August, that the right course is to hasten slowly with a modest programme.

(g) Visits

We have already tried to persuade the Minister of Defence to visit Farnborough. The information budget for the current financial year makes no provision for other visits from Iraq; but modest sums could perhaps be made available if you should wish to recommend one or two visitors later this ^{financial} year. You will no doubt be making proposals in due course about possible visits next year.

A.M.T.
11-11.

I am sending copies of this
despatch to H.N. Representative
in Amman Ankara Beirut
Cairo Tel Aviv Kuwait Tehran
Tel Aviv 5 with to the
Political Resident Paris Gully and
to the H.N. Permanent Representative
in U.N.

CONFIDENTIAL

2

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

NEQ 3/548/1 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Whitehall Distribution*

IRAQ

29 November, 1968

Section 1

THE FUTURE OF ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS

Mr. Trefor Evans to Mr. Stewart. (Received 29 November)

SUMMARY

1. Iraq's orientation towards Britain in the educational field is well established and is valuable to us. Money spent on the British Council's work in Iraq is a good investment. (Paragraphs 2-4.)

2. British trade with Iraq is also well established and it should be an aim of our policy to avoid creating a situation in which the Iraqi Government discriminates against British goods for political reasons. (Paragraph 5.)

3. Since our principal economic interest in Iraq is that the Iraq Petroleum Company should continue to operate profitably, a settlement of the company's dispute with the Government is highly desirable. A helpful attitude by Her Majesty's Government can do much to benefit Anglo-Iraqi relations. (Paragraph 6.)

4. There is renewed Iraqi interest in buying arms from Britain and in obtaining military training for their forces from us. Her Majesty's Government should give sympathetic consideration to any proposals for the sale to Iraq of military equipment which is largely defensive in nature. As regards offensive weapons, it should not be forgotten that other Powers are prepared to supply them and that we should not appear to be trying to keep the Iraqis tied to our apron-strings. (Paragraph 7.)

5. Palestine dominates Iraq's foreign policy, and the attitude adopted by Her Majesty's Government towards the Arab case will largely determine the temperature of official Anglo-Iraqi relations. Although our position has improved considerably since June 1967, we shall have to tread delicately in order to avoid re-awakening latent suspicion and antagonism. (Paragraph 8.)

6. Other issues of vital interest to Iraq are Kurdistan and the future of the Persian Gulf. Although the former is an internal matter, we should be prepared to give the Iraqis a sympathetic hearing when they speak to us about it. As for the Gulf, we should avoid giving them the impression that a solution is being imposed without their being consulted. (Paragraphs 9-10.)

7. Although the best use is not being made of existing financial resources, Her Majesty's Government should consider supporting Iraq's requests to the World Bank for aid for economic and social development. British firms should be encouraged to participate in the sensible development of Iraqi industry. (Paragraph 11.)

8. Relations between Britain and Iraq can be improved only in the most gradual way. We should develop the positive elements in our relationship irrespective of the stability or otherwise of the Government of the day. (Paragraph 12.)

CONFIDENTIAL

(Confidential)

Sir,

*Baghdad,**23 November, 1968.*

Six months have passed since the reopening of this post which had been closed since the Iraqis broke off relations at the time of the six-day war with Israel. The break of relations and the expulsion of my predecessor and his staff mark perhaps a stage in Iraq's development as an independent State, since these actions demonstrated that she was indeed able to cut the ties with the Power that had in large measure created her after the First World War and had exercised a predominant influence over her for almost 40 years. The bitter experience of the diplomatic break, though it was brought about through hasty and emotional reaction to allegations which were later disproved, may nevertheless be the prelude to a period in which Anglo-Iraqi relations are less hampered by the legacy of the past and are based to a greater extent on present-day realities. The links between the two countries are substantial and are found in many spheres of activity, and I now have the honour to review the most important of them and to offer my comments on ways in which they can be strengthened to our advantage.

2. Although the period of direct and indirect British domination of Iraq has left an impression on Anglo-Iraqi relations which is not uniformly favourable to their development in present circumstances, the orientation towards Britain in the field of education which resulted from that period is an undoubted asset and one that could well appreciate in value. The professional middle class, including the officer class, contains a large proportion of men and women who have received their training in the United Kingdom; others have studied in Iraqi institutions where British influence has been strong and in which English was the language of instruction. Although in recent years greater numbers than before have pursued their studies in the United States and in Eastern and Western Europe, I doubt whether the number of those in Britain has fallen in absolute terms; it is said to be as many as 1,700 at the present time. On the whole the impression which Iraqi students form of Britain and of the British on their home ground is a favourable one, and they have considerable regard for the quality of British society and institutions. A number of them take British wives, though fewer

are likely to do so because the Government have recently announced that Iraqis who marry non-Arab wives in future will be ineligible for civil service posts.

3. The wish of middle-class Iraqis - and of those who aspire to middle-class status to acquire education in Britain, or at least to learn English, is something which is likely to continue, even if we do little actively to encourage it. The habit has been formed, personal links exist, the widespread teaching of English in Iraqi schools makes it easier for young people to pursue their studies in English than in any other foreign language, and the flow of undergraduate and post-graduate students to Britain has therefore acquired a momentum of its own. There can be little doubt that this situation is of benefit to us as well as to the Iraqis who acquire education from us. They are enabled to put to use their human potential (and it is encouraging to see what good results education can produce from Iraqi material); we acquire prestige as being people who have knowledge to impart; we derive commercial advantage through their familiarity with British methods and products and we can reasonably hope that in time the growing civilian professional and middle classes will come to exercise a political influence which the military dictatorship at present largely denies them. One cannot claim that this hope has a clear expectation of fulfilment: the future political development of Iraq is particularly difficult to forecast, but it is to be hoped that the desire of a notable proportion of the educated minority for decent government will gradually bring about some improvement of standards.

4. If this analysis is correct, I consider that it would be a wise investment to spend money to encourage the processes which I have described. A large part of the credit for the position which British education and culture now hold in Iraq is undoubtedly due to the work of the British Council. Through its teaching of English, the provision of a library of books in English, the offer of scholarships and the help given to those who wish to pursue their studies in Britain the Council has been the prime instrument which has brought about British cultural pre-eminence among educated Iraqis. Comparatively modest expenditure on the Council's activities in this country will enable it to continue its valuable role.

5. The historical factors which have led to the orientation towards Britain in the cultural field have also contributed to the favourable position Britain enjoys in commerce. British-made goods predominated when Iraq made its first acquaintance with the products of the industrialised West, and it was natural that a high proportion of trade in these goods should later be directed towards the Western country with which Iraq had closest contact. Trade followed the flag, and while Iraq was within the British sphere of influence, which one might say was up until the *coup d'état* of 1958, the lion's share of the development contracts which laid the foundation of a modern developing State went to British firms. Although the position has changed considerably since then in that the Government and the market are more knowledgeable about other industrialised countries and more willing to trade with them, trade with Britain continued at a high level until June 1967, even though our share of trade decreased. The fall in British exports to this market which resulted from official discrimination against British goods during the break in diplomatic relations may prove to have been no more than a temporary setback, unless another situation arises in which Iraq decides to discriminate against us once more for political reasons. Clearly, it should be an aim of our policy to avoid creating such a situation.

6. Our principal economic interest in Iraq is, of course, that the Iraq Petroleum Company should continue to operate profitably. Through its large investments in this country, the company is able to make a valuable contribution to the United Kingdom's balance of payments and to the United Kingdom's requirements for oil. The company's position is, however, threatened by the dispute arising from the host Government's nationalisation of the bulk of its concessionary area which has embittered their relations and made mutually profitable co-operation in the further exploitation of Iraqi oil problematical. A settlement of the dispute on terms acceptable to the company is therefore highly desirable from Her Majesty's Government's point of view since it would not only ensure the continuation of the company's operations, with all the benefits they bring to the United Kingdom, but would also remove a major obstacle to the improvement of Anglo-Iraqi relations. A dispute between the Government and the

British company which runs Iraq's most important industry and which provides by far the greater part of Iraq's foreign exchange earnings cannot fail to have a harmful effect on British Governmental relations with Iraq, and it is inevitable from the Iraqi viewpoint that they should look to Her Majesty's Government for assistance in the matter. The part which Her Majesty's Government can play is limited, and it is essential that the Iraqi authorities should understand that it is so; but it is also important that we should appear to them to be being helpful within the limits imposed by the nature of our relationship with the company. It need hardly be said that we must avoid being used by the Iraqis as an instrument to bring pressure on the company; yet there are times when we can contribute to a more just appreciation by the company of the consequences of the various lines of approach open to them. A helpful attitude based on the common interest of all concerned in maintaining and increasing the flow of oil can do much to benefit the wider cause of relations between the two countries.

7. The armed forces have dominated Iraq's political life for the last 10 years, and the purchase of arms has been one of their main preoccupations—ostensibly because of the need for strength to face external enemies but also for reasons of prestige and in order to tighten their grip on power. They have also hoped at various times, vainly, that modern weapons of war would allow them to bring about a military solution of the Kurdish rebellion, which is a serious source of internal weakness. Since 1958 the Soviet Union has been Iraq's principal supplier of arms and aircraft, although Britain also has sold fighter planes and helicopters. Since our resumption of diplomatic relations, however, and particularly since the appointment of General Hardan al-Takriti as Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister, there have been clear signs of Iraqi interest in the purchase of more British equipment, aircraft, an air defence system and military vehicles, and in British military training. An important element in their thinking is probably the wish not to become over-committed to the Soviet Union; another factor is respect for British equipment and for British military methods dating from the days of close association between the forces of the two countries which lasted until the overthrow of the monarchy. Our

reaction to any proposed sale of equipment to Iraq must obviously depend on an assessment of the use they are likely to make of it. In the light of the Iraqi threat to Kuwait, the British commitment to defend Kuwait has naturally figured largely in our thinking in the past and will continue to do so so long as it remains valid, although it appears from a recent conversation between Her Majesty's Ambassador in Kuwait and the Kuwaiti Prime Minister that the Kuwaitis themselves would not object to the sale of British aircraft. We cannot be entirely certain, however, that the Kuwaitis are correct in apparently dismissing the possibility of a renewed threat from Iraq; the Kurdish and Palestine problems are admittedly likely to preoccupy the Iraqis, but the Kuwaitis and their friends would be unwise not to guard against the risk that an opportunist régime in Iraq would take advantage of instability in the Gulf either before or after our withdrawal. Even apart from the particular problem of Kuwait, it would clearly not be in our interest that an unfriendly Iraq should have powerful and effective forces capable of operating outside her own frontiers. There is, however, a considerable range of equipment which we could sell and which would not bring about that result. An air defence system, for example, and aircraft for a defensive role would not increase Iraq's ability to trouble her neighbours, yet would be valuable British exports which would moreover tend to pull Iraq back from an extreme anti-Western stance. In my submission, therefore, Her Majesty's Government should give sympathetic consideration to any proposals which may materialise for the purchase by Iraq of military equipment which is largely defensive in nature. As regards offensive weapons, it should not be forgotten that other Powers are prepared to supply them and also that it can do us no good to appear to the Iraqis to be trying to keep them on our apron strings.

8. It is Palestine, however, which dominates Iraq's foreign policy, and the attitude adopted by Her Majesty's Government towards the Arab case will largely determine the temperature of official Anglo-Iraqi relations. While Iraqi Governments for the past 30 years have devoted particular attention to the question of Palestine, the practical effect has been slight, probably because it has arisen more out of a need to find at least one cause on which Iraqis could agree than out of deeply-felt emotion,

though that too does exist. Nevertheless, perhaps because of their inability to influence events in Palestine directly, Iraqi Governments tend to adopt extreme positions in any discussion of Arab rights and to seize on other ways of proving their devotion to the cause, for example by breaking off diplomatic relations with the "aggressor States" in June 1967 and advocating a ban on oil exports. Since then Her Majesty's Government have succeeded in demonstrating that their policies are not wholly opposed to Arab interests and the Iraqis now accept that at least part of the blame should fall on the Arabs for the general lack of understanding of the Arab case in Western Europe at the time of the six-day war. Much suspicion still remains however, particularly among Left-wing elements, including the Ba'ath Party itself, and we shall have to tread delicately if all the latent antagonisms are not to be aroused when, as is inevitable, we are unable to go as far as the Arabs demand in, for instance, condemning Israel in the Security Council or in imposing mandatory sanctions or in withholding supplies of arms. Any one of many such issues could leave Her Majesty's Government exposed to Iraq's angry disappointment and to the risk of retaliation, whether by riot, severance of diplomatic relations, trade boycott or a combination of these and other measures. These considerations are, I know, well understood by your Department, and I mention them again merely to indicate the important part which our attitude in the United Nations and elsewhere to the Palestine problem plays in Iraq's assessment of the state of Anglo-Iraqi relations.

9. There are of course other issues too which are of vital interest to Iraq, and the more understanding and sympathy we can show for the Iraqi point of view, for Iraq's difficulty and for her legitimate aspirations, the more influence we are likely to have here. The first of these issues is that of Kurdistan. Kurdish Nationalism has bedevilled the Iraqi State since its creation and, to the extent that Her Majesty's Government were responsible for the inclusion of Kurdish areas within the new State, it can be argued that Her Majesty's Government have some obligation in the matter. On the other hand, it is clearly necessary that nothing is done to impair our friendly relations with neighbouring Turkey and Iran, both of which are deeply concerned in the Kurdish question. For this reason, notwithstanding our interest in the

stability of Iraq and of its increasing prosperity, our policy has been one of non-interference in what is primarily an internal matter for Iraq. In general our attitude has with the approval of the Iraqi Government. There have been occasions, however, when the Government of the day have asked us to use our influence in Tehran in favour of a settlement. On the last occasion, which was a few months ago, Her Majesty's Ambassador in Tehran took a suitable opportunity to mention to the Iranian authorities Iraqi concern at developments in Northern Iraq. Although there was little reaction, the effort was, I have no doubt, worth while and it is encouraging that the Iranians at several levels are more than ready to discuss the situation in Iraq which is naturally of very considerable interest to them. From the point of view of our relations with Iraq, the important thing is that Iraqis should feel able to speak to us about their difficulties and to be sure of having at least a sympathetic hearing.

10. Developments in the Persian Gulf in the light of the impending British military withdrawal is another subject that the Iraqi Government can be expected to raise with us in due course. Although Saudi Arabia and Iran are obviously more directly concerned, it would be wrong, I submit, to cold-shoulder the Iraqis and to give them the impression that a solution is being imposed upon them without any prior consultation. Again it is a question of gaining their confidence and thereby increasing our influence here.

11. Finally, I come to the question of aid for economic and social development to which I referred briefly in paragraph 9 of my despatch 1/3 of the 15th of August. Since that despatch was written, representatives of the World Bank have visited Iraq and have shown interest in a number of projects, including agricultural ones. This is encouraging, as relations between the bank and Iraq during recent years have been unhappy and unproductive—in 1964 and 1966 negotiations for the financing of projects in the fields of agriculture and road building were abortive. There is, of course, no doubt that the best use is not being made of existing financial resources, particularly those accruing from oil revenues—an undue proportion is being spent on armaments—but this is a common phenomenon in under-developed countries. There is abundant evidence that the country is suffering from a shortage of revenue and

that day-to-day administration, not to mention development, in the provinces, is suffering from it. It is also encouraging that the President and his closest advisers are attaching the greatest importance to rural development in an effort to curb the disastrous influx of population into the towns and, according to the Minister of Planning, 70 per cent of the next Five-year Plan will be devoted to improving conditions in the countryside. I therefore have no hesitation in repeating my previous recommendation that Her Majesty's Government should consider giving, and be seen to be giving, the Iraqi Government the maximum possible support in the Councils of the World Bank. Similarly, I trust that encouragement will be given to British firms, particularly the British Leyland Motor Corporation and Massey Ferguson, who are showing interest in participation in the sensible development of Iraqi industry.

12. It would, of course, be an illusion to think that relations between the two countries can be improved in anything other than the most gradual way. Britain is still remembered as the former occupying Power, and it is not fashionable in the Middle East to think well, let alone speak well, of former occupiers. We are also remembered as the Power during whose period of supremacy the foundations of the State of Israel were laid, and so long as the Arabs feel humiliation at the hands of Israel, the Iraqis will resent the part we played in setting the stage for their humiliation. As if this were not enough, their economy is almost wholly dependent on an ostensibly British oil company which is considered to be working primarily in the interest of forces outside Iraq which are not susceptible to Iraqi control. And yet, as I have tried to show in this and other reports, there are positive elements in their relationship with us which can be developed to our mutual advantage. They should not, I suggest, be neglected, irrespective of the stability or otherwise of the Government of the day.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Amman, Ankara, Beirut, Cairo, Jedda, Kuwait, Tehran, Tel Aviv and Washington and to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf and the United Kingdom Mission in New York.

I have, &c.

T. E. EVANS.

NE

(2)



BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

23 November 1968

(1/3)

CONFIDENTIALBAGHDAD DESPATCH of the 23rd November
1968RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 15

29 NOV 1968

NEA 3/548/1

SUMMARYThe Future of Anglo-Iraqi Relations

1. Iraq's orientation towards Britain in the educational field is well-established and is valuable to us. Money spent on The British Council's work in Iraq is a good investment. (Paragraphs 2-4) *Mr. Ibbot*
2. British trade with Iraq is also well-established and it should be an aim of our policy to avoid creating a situation in which the Iraqi Government discriminates against British goods for political reasons. (Paragraph 5) *Minute*
3. Since our principal economic interest in Iraq is that the Iraq Petroleum Company should continue to operate profitably, a settlement of the Company's dispute with the Government is highly desirable. A helpful attitude by Her Majesty's Government can do much to benefit Anglo-Iraqi relations. (Paragraph 6) *Arabian Dept*
4. There is renewed Iraqi interest in buying arms from Britain and in obtaining military training for their forces from us. Her Majesty's Government should give sympathetic consideration to any proposals for the sale to Iraq of military equipment which is largely defensive in nature. As regards offensive weapons, it should not be forgotten that other Powers are prepared to supply them and that we should not appear to be trying to keep the Iraqis tied to our apron strings. (Paragraph 7) *oil*
5. Palestine dominates Iraq's foreign policy, and the attitude adopted by Her Majesty's Government towards the Arab case will largely determine the temperature of official Anglo-Iraqi relations. Although our position has improved considerably since June 1967, we shall have to tread delicately in order to avoid re-awakening latent suspicion and antagonism. (Paragraph 8) *Planning*
6. Other issues of vital interest to Iraq are Kurdistan and the future of the Persian Gulf. Although the former is an internal matter, we should be prepared to give the Iraqis a sympathetic hearing when they speak to us about it. As for the Gulf, we should avoid giving them the impression that a solution is being imposed without their being consulted. (Paragraphs 9 and 10) *23.12*

CONFIDENTIAL

17.



CONFIDENTIAL

7. Although the best use is not being made of existing financial resources, Her Majesty's Government should consider supporting Iraq's requests to the World Bank for aid for economic and social development. British firms should be encouraged to participate in the sensible development of Iraqi industry. (Paragraph 11)
8. Relations between Britain and Iraq can be improved only in the most gradual way. We should develop the positive elements in our relationship irrespective of the stability or otherwise of the Government of the day. (Paragraph 12)



BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

23 November 1968

(1/3)

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

Six months have passed since the re-opening of this post which had been closed since the Iraqis broke off relations at the time of the six-day war with Israel. The break of relations and the expulsion of my predecessor and his staff mark perhaps a stage in Iraq's development as an independent State, since these actions demonstrated that she was indeed able to cut the ties with the Power that had in large measure created her after the First World War and had exercised a predominant influence over her for almost forty years. The bitter experience of the diplomatic break, though it was brought about through hasty and emotional reaction to allegations which were later disproved, may nevertheless be the prelude to a period in which Anglo-Iraqi relations are less hampered by the legacy of the past and are based to a greater extent on present-day realities. The links between the two countries are substantial and are found in many spheres of activity, and I now have the honour to review the most important of them and to offer my comments on ways in which they can be strengthened to our advantage.

/2.

The Right Honourable
Michael Stewart, M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.,

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

2. Although the period of direct and indirect British domination of Iraq has left an impression on Anglo/Iraqi relations which is not uniformly favourable to their development in present circumstances, the orientation towards Britain in the field of education which resulted from that period is an undoubted asset and one that could well appreciate in value. The professional middle-class, including the officer class, contains a large proportion of men and women who have received their training in the United Kingdom; others have studied in Iraqi institutions where British influence has been strong and in which English was the language of instruction. Although in recent years greater numbers than before have pursued their studies in the United States and in Eastern and Western Europe, I doubt whether the number of those in Britain has fallen in absolute terms; it is said to be as many as 1,700 at the present time. On the whole the impression which Iraqi students form of Britain and of the British on their home ground is a favourable one, and they have considerable regard for the quality of British society and institutions. A number of them take British wives, though fewer are likely to do so because the Government have recently announced that Iraqis who marry non-Arab wives in future will be ineligible for Civil Service posts.

3. The wish of middle-class Iraqis and of those who aspire to middle-class status to acquire education in Britain, or at least to learn English, is something which is likely to continue, even if we do little actively to encourage it. The habit has
/been

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

been formed, personal links exist, the widespread teaching of English in Iraqi schools makes it easier for young people to pursue their studies in English than in any other foreign language, and the flow of undergraduate and post-graduate students to Britain has therefore acquired a momentum of its own. There can be little doubt that this situation is of benefit to us as well as to the Iraqis who acquire education from us. They are enabled to put to use their human potential (and it is encouraging to see what good results education can produce from Iraqi material); we acquire prestige as being people who have knowledge to impart; we derive commercial advantage through their familiarity with British methods and products and we can reasonably hope that in time the growing civilian professional and middle-classes will come to exercise a political influence which the military dictatorship at present largely denies them. One cannot claim that this hope has a clear expectation of fulfilment: the future political development of Iraq is particularly difficult to forecast, but it is to be hoped that the desire of a notable proportion of the educated minority for decent government will gradually bring about some improvement of standards.

4. If this analysis is correct, I consider that it would be a wise investment to spend money to encourage the processes which I have described. A large part of the credit for the position which British education and culture now hold in Iraq is undoubtedly due to the work of the British Council. Through its
/teaching

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

teaching of English, the provision of a library of books in English, the offer of scholarships and the help given to those who wish to pursue their studies in Britain the Council has been the prime instrument which has brought about British cultural pre-eminence among educated Iraqis. Comparatively modest expenditure on the Council's activities in this country will enable it to continue its valuable role.

5. The historical factors which have led to the orientation towards Britain in the cultural field have also contributed to the favourable position Britain enjoys in commerce. British-made goods predominated when Iraq made its first acquaintance with the products of the industrialised West, and it was natural that a high proportion of trade in these goods should later be directed towards the Western country with which Iraq had closest contact. Trade followed the flag, and while Iraq was within the British sphere of influence, which one might say was up until the coup d'état of 1958, the lion's share of the development contracts which laid the foundation of a modern developing State went to British firms. Although the position has changed considerably since then in that the Government and the market are more knowledgeable about other industrialised countries and more willing to trade with them, trade with Britain continued at a high level until June 1967, even though our share of trade decreased. The fall in British exports to this market which resulted from official discrimination against British goods during the break in diplomatic relations may prove to have been no more than a

/temporary

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

temporary setback, unless another situation arises in which Iraq decides to discriminate against us once more for political reasons. Clearly, it should be an aim of our policy to avoid creating such a situation.

6. Our principal economic interest in Iraq is, of course, that the Iraq Petroleum Company should continue to operate profitably. Through its large investments in this country, the Company is able to make a valuable contribution to the United Kingdom's balance of payments and to the United Kingdom's requirements for oil. The Company's position is, however, threatened by the dispute arising from the host Government's nationalisation of the bulk of its concessionary area which has embittered their relations and made mutually profitable cooperation in the further exploitation of Iraqi oil problematical. A settlement of the dispute on terms acceptable to the Company is therefore highly desirable from Her Majesty's Government's point of view since it would not only ensure the continuation of the Company's operations, with all the benefits they bring to the United Kingdom, but would also remove a major obstacle to the improvement of Anglo-Iraqi relations. A dispute between the Government and the British company which runs Iraq's most important industry and which provides by far the greater part of Iraq's foreign exchange earnings cannot fail to have a harmful effect on British governmental relations with Iraq, and it is inevitable from the Iraqi viewpoint that they should look to Her Majesty's Government for assistance in the matter. The part
/which

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

which Her Majesty's Government can play is limited, and it is essential that the Iraqi authorities should understand that it is so; but it is also important that we should appear to them to be being helpful within the limits imposed by the nature of our relationship with the Company. It need hardly be said that we must avoid being used by the Iraqis as an instrument to bring pressure on the Company; yet there are times when we can contribute to a more just appreciation by the Company of the consequences of the various lines of approach open to them. A helpful attitude based on the common interest of all concerned in maintaining and increasing the flow of oil can do much to benefit the wider cause of relations between the two countries.

7. The Armed Forces have dominated Iraq's political life for the last ten years, and the purchase of arms has been one of their main preoccupations - ostensibly because of the need for strength to face external enemies but also for reasons of prestige and in order to tighten their grip on power. They have also hoped at various times, vainly, that modern weapons of war would allow them to bring about a military solution of the Kurdish rebellion, which is a serious source of internal weakness. Since 1958 the Soviet Union has been Iraq's principal supplier of arms and aircraft, although Britain also has sold fighter planes and helicopters. Since our resumption of diplomatic relations, however, and particularly since the appointment of General Hardan al-Takriti as Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister, there have been clear signs of Iraqi interest in the purchase of

/more

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

more British equipment, aircraft, an air defence system and military vehicles, and in British military training. An important element in their thinking is probably the wish not to become over-committed to the Soviet Union; another factor is respect for British equipment and for British military methods dating from the days of close association between the forces of the two countries which lasted until the overthrow of the monarchy. Our reaction to any proposed sale of equipment to Iraq must obviously depend on an assessment of the use they are likely to make of it. In the light of the Iraqi threat to Kuwait, the British commitment to defend Kuwait has naturally figured largely in our thinking in the past and will continue to do so so long as it remains valid, although it appears from a recent conversation between H.M. Ambassador in Kuwait and the Kuwaiti Prime Minister that the Kuwaitis themselves would not object to the sale of British aircraft. We cannot be entirely certain, however, that the Kuwaitis are correct in apparently dismissing the possibility of a renewed threat from Iraq; the Kurdish and Palestine problems are admittedly likely to preoccupy the Iraqis, but the Kuwaitis and their friends would be unwise not to guard against the risk that an opportunist régime in Iraq would take advantage of instability in the Gulf either before or after our withdrawal. Even apart from the particular problem of Kuwait, it would clearly not be in our interest that an unfriendly Iraq should have powerful and effective forces capable of operating outside her own frontiers. There is,

/however

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

however, a considerable range of equipment which we could sell and which would not bring about that result. An air defence system, for example, and aircraft for a defensive role would not increase Iraq's ability to trouble her neighbours, yet would be valuable British exports which would moreover tend to pull Iraq back from an extreme anti-Western stance. In my submission, therefore, Her Majesty's Government should give sympathetic consideration to any proposals which may materialise for the purchase by Iraq of military equipment which is largely defensive in nature. As regards offensive weapons, it should not be forgotten that other Powers are prepared to supply them and also that it can do us no good to appear to the Iraqis to be trying to keep them on our apron strings.

8. It is Palestine, however, which dominates Iraq's foreign policy, and the attitude adopted by Her Majesty's Government towards the Arab case will largely determine the temperature of official Anglo-Iraqi relations. While Iraqi Governments for the past thirty years have devoted particular attention to the question of Palestine, the practical effect has been slight, probably because it has arisen more out of a need to find at least one cause on which Iraqis could agree than out of deeply-felt emotion, though that too does exist. Nevertheless, perhaps because of their inability to influence events in Palestine directly, Iraqi Governments tend to adopt extreme positions in any discussion of Arab rights and to seize on other ways of

/proving

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

proving their devotion to the cause, for example by breaking off diplomatic relations with the "aggressor states" in June 1967 and advocating a ban on oil exports. Since then, Her Majesty's Government have succeeded in demonstrating that their policies are not wholly opposed to Arab interests and the Iraqis now accept that at least part of the blame should fall on the Arabs for the general lack of understanding of the Arab case in Western Europe at the time of the six-day war. Much suspicion still remains however, particularly among left-wing elements, including the Ba'ath Party itself, and we shall have to tread delicately if all the latent antagonisms are not to be aroused when, as is inevitable, we are unable to go as far as the Arabs demand in, for instance, condemning Israel in the Security Council or in imposing mandatory sanctions or in withholding supplies of arms. Any one of many such issues could leave Her Majesty's Government exposed to Iraq's angry disappointment and to the risk of retaliation, whether by riot, severance of diplomatic relations, trade boycott or a combination of these and other measures. These considerations are, I know, well understood by your Department, and I mention them again merely to indicate the important part which our attitude in the United Nations and elsewhere to the Palestine problem plays in Iraq's assessment of the state of Anglo-Iraqi relations.

9. There are of course other issues too which are of vital interest to Iraq, and the more understanding and sympathy we can show for the Iraqi point of view, for Iraq's difficulty and

/for

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

for her legitimate aspirations, the more influence we are likely to have here. The first of these issues is that of Kurdistan. Kurdish nationalism has bedevilled the Iraqi State since its creation and, to the extent that Her Majesty's Government were responsible for the inclusion of Kurdish areas within the new State, it can be argued that Her Majesty's Government have some obligation in the matter. On the other hand, it is clearly necessary that nothing is done to impair our friendly relations with neighbouring Turkey and Iran, both of which are deeply concerned in the Kurdish question. For this reason, notwithstanding our interest in the stability of Iraq and of its increasing prosperity, our policy has been one of non-interference in what is primarily an internal matter for Iraq. In general our attitude has met with the approval of the Iraqi Government. There have been occasions, however, when the Government of the day have asked us to use our influence in Tehran in favour of a settlement. On the last occasion, which was a few months ago, Her Majesty's Ambassador in Tehran took a suitable opportunity to mention to the Iranian authorities Iraqi concern at developments in Northern Iraq. Although there was little reaction, the effort was, I have no doubt, worthwhile and it is encouraging that the Iranians at several levels are more than ready to discuss the situation in Iraq which is naturally of very considerable interest to them. From the point of view of our relations with Iraq, the important thing is that Iraqis should feel able to speak to us about their difficulties and to be sure of having at least a sympathetic hearing.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

10. Developments in the Persian Gulf in the light of the impending British military withdrawal is another subject that the Iraqi Government can be expected to raise with us in due course. Although Saudi-Arabia and Iran are obviously more directly concerned, it would be wrong, I submit, to cold-shoulder the Iraqis and to give them the impression that a solution is being imposed upon them without any prior consultation. Again it is a question of gaining their confidence and thereby increasing our influence here.

11. Finally, I come to the question of aid for economic and social development to which I referred briefly in paragraph 9 of my despatch 1/3 of the 15th of August. Since that despatch was written, representatives of the World Bank have visited Iraq and have shown interest in a number of projects, including agricultural ones. This is encouraging, as relations between the Bank and Iraq during recent years have been unhappy and unproductive - in 1964 and 1966 negotiations for the financing of projects in the fields of agriculture and road building were abortive. There is, of course, no doubt that the best use is not being made of existing financial resources, particularly those accruing from oil revenues - an undue proportion is being spent on armaments - but this is a common phenomenon in under-developed countries. There is abundant evidence that the country is suffering from a shortage of revenue and that day to day administration, not to mention development, in the provinces, is suffering from it. It is also encouraging that the President

/and

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

and his closest advisers are attaching the greatest importance to rural development in an effort to curb the disastrous influx of population into the towns and, according to the Minister of Planning, 70% of the next Five Year Plan will be devoted to improving conditions in the countryside. I therefore have no hesitation in repeating my previous recommendation that Her Majesty's Government should consider giving, and be seen to be giving, the Iraqi Government the maximum possible support in the Councils of the World Bank. Similarly, I trust that encouragement will be given to British firms, particularly the British Leyland Motor Corporation and Massey Ferguson, who are showing interest in participation in the sensible development of Iraqi industry.

12. It would, of course, be an illusion to think that relations between the two countries can be improved in anything other than the most gradual way. Britain is still remembered as the former occupying Power, and it is not fashionable in the Middle East to think well, let alone speak well, of former occupiers. We are also remembered as the Power during whose period of supremacy the foundations of the State of Israel were laid, and so long as the Arabs feel humiliation at the hands of Israel, the Iraqis will resent the part we played in setting the stage for their humiliation. As if this were not enough, their economy is almost wholly dependent on an ostensibly British oil company which is considered to be working primarily in the interest of forces outside Iraq which are not susceptible to

/Iraqi

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Iraqi control. And yet, as I have tried to show in this and other reports, there are positive elements in their relationship with us which can be developed to our mutual advantage. They should not, I suggest, be neglected, irrespective of the stability or otherwise of the Government of the day.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to H.M. Representatives in Amman, Ankara, Beirut, Cairo, Jedda, Kuwait, Tehran, Tel Aviv and Washington and to the Political Residenc, Persian Gulf and the United Kingdom Mission in New York.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant

A handwritten signature in dark ink, consisting of several fluid, connected strokes, positioned below the typed signature.

CONFIDENTIAL



BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

23 November 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

BAGHDAD DESPATCH of the 23rd November
1968

SUMMARY

The Future of Anglo-Iraqi Relations

NE
2

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.15 29 NOV 1968 NE a 3/548/1
--

Jan minute
Arabian Dept
19/12/68
oil
Planning
23.12

1. Iraq's orientation towards Britain in the educational field is well-established and is valuable to us. Money spent on The British Council's work in Iraq is a good investment. (Paragraphs 2-4)
2. British trade with Iraq is also well-established and it should be an aim of our policy to avoid creating a situation in which the Iraqi Government discriminates against British goods for political reasons. (Paragraph 5)
3. Since our principal economic interest in Iraq is that the Iraq Petroleum Company should continue to operate profitably, a settlement of the Company's dispute with the Government is highly desirable. A helpful attitude by Her Majesty's Government can do much to benefit Anglo-Iraqi relations. (Paragraph 6)
4. There is renewed Iraqi interest in buying arms from Britain and in obtaining military training for their forces from us. Her Majesty's Government should give sympathetic consideration to any proposals for the sale to Iraq of military equipment which is largely defensive in nature. As regards offensive weapons, it should not be forgotten that other Powers are prepared to supply them and that we should not appear to be trying to keep the Iraqis tied to our apron strings. (Paragraph 7)
5. Palestine dominates Iraq's foreign policy, and the attitude adopted by Her Majesty's Government towards the Arab case will largely determine the temperature of official Anglo-Iraqi relations. Although our position has improved considerably since June 1967, we shall have to tread delicately in order to avoid re-awakening latent suspicion and antagonism. (Paragraph 8)
6. Other issues of vital interest to Iraq are Kurdistan and the future of the Persian Gulf. Although the former is an internal matter, we should be prepared to give the Iraqis a sympathetic hearing when they speak to us about it. As for the Gulf, we should avoid giving them the impression that a solution is being imposed without their being consulted. (Paragraphs 9 and 10)

CONFIDENTIAL

17.

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....

NEQ 3/548/1
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 15
10 DEC 1968
NEQ 3/548/1

3

~~Mr. Evans~~

~~Mr. Makinson~~

The Future of Anglo Iraqi relations: Baghdad

despatch of 23 November

Mr. Trefor Evans' despatch outlines the areas of British interest in Iraq, against a background of earlier Anglo-Iraqi relations and of current problems and prejudices.

2. All departments would, I think, agree that Britain's major interest in Iraq is in oil. Mr. Evans adds those of commercial and military sales, and argues for help in the financial field, if not with funds at least with support in the Councils of the World Bank.

3. H.M. Ambassador believes that our future policy should be so framed as to avoid creating a situation in which the Iraqi government discriminates against British goods for political reasons; but the record shows that Iraqi political decisions are not always taken on grounds of logic (or even of Iraqi interests), and that the last decision to discriminate (in June last year) was not taken as a result of our actions but as emotional reaction to false propaganda.

4. I recommend that the despatch be printed for F.C.O./Whitehall distribution and that an advance copy be circulated to Under Secretaries and Sir Denis Allen. I have already sent a copy to Commodities and Oil Department.

5. I have prepared a copy for printing, and attach a draft acknowledgement.

D. J. Makinson

(D. J. Makinson)
Near Eastern Dept.
Room W133,
Tel: MB 1163
29 November, 1968.

Copy to:

Mr. Fearnley (Commodities and Oil Dept.)

CONFIDENTIAL

/ I

I have sent a copy of the despatch for printing (as recorded in the pro forma minute covering this one) and have sent an advance copy to Mr. Roberts's Private Secretary.

2. I do not recommend priority printing, but think that the minuted copy of the despatch ought to be submitted. The despatch deals with most of the subjects which are likely to give content to Anglo-Iraqi relations during the next few years.

3. It is a pity that Mr. Evans's despatch crossed the Secretary of State's despatch NEQ 3/1 of 12 November, which dealt with very much the same subject. All the same, there are a number of points which I think we shall need to consider before Mr. Evans responds to our despatch. One of these is Iraqi relations with the World Bank. As you will see, Mr. Evans has repeated his early recommendation that we should consider giving the Iraqi Government the maximum possible support in the counsels of the World Bank (paragraph 11). We did not deal with this subject in our own despatch. Nor did we say anything specific about the Persian Gulf. Although Mr. Evans does not recommend that we should concert our policy in the Persian Gulf with the Iraqi Government, he suggests that it would be wrong to cold-shoulder the Iraqis and give them the impression that a solution is being imposed on them without any prior consultation (paragraph 10). Finally, there is the question of what role we should play in trying to bring about an agreement between the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi Petroleum Company. In our despatch, we instructed Mr. Evans to refrain from taking any initiatives, however informal in nature, and to be circumspect in discussing oil matters if the Iraqis should raise them (paragraph 8). Mr. Evans believes it to be important that we should appear to the Iraqis to be being helpful within the limits imposed by the nature of our relationship with the company (paragraph 6). This suggests to me that he is still keen to play a more active part than we should wish.

4. All the same, I think that the despatch is a good one. It is closely argued and does not suggest that Mr. Evans is feeling more optimistic about the future of Anglo-Iraqi relations than general circumstances would warrant.

R. M. Evans

R. M. Evans
5 December, 1968.

I agree with
N. Evans.

ANN.
6.12.

Ref & Submit Jan 9/12
For A, see separate minute
B has been dealt with by Arabian Dept (see S & min)
C by C & Oil Dept. CONFIDENTIAL Jan 23/

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference..... NEQ 3/548/1

with ③

12. 3. 1968 AFB 27/1

Mr. Petrie (F.P. & A. Dept.)

World Bank credit for Iraq

Baghdad's despatch NEQ 3/548/1 f.2 of 29 November, 1968 makes certain recommendations for the improvement of relations between Britain and Iraq. Most of them have either been implemented or are being met. There is one point, that of borrowings from the World Bank (paragraph 11) where we should like to be able to make a friendly gesture towards Iraq.

2. Iraq is technically, I suspect, not a very good risk (only 20% of her oil revenues was spent on development last year, compared with 70% before the Revolution of 1958) but she has a good reputation for paying her debts. The Treasury will in any case, I suppose, know the World Bank appraisal of Iraq's economy.

D. J. Makinson

(D. J. Makinson)
Near Eastern Department
23 January, 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

4

Mr. Miers

NEQ 3/548/1

The Future of Anglo-Iraqi Relations

--- I attach an advance copy of Mr. Evans' despatch
 1/3 of 23 November on this subject. It is unfortunate
 --- that the despatch crossed the Secretary of State's
 despatch to Mr. Evans NEQ 3/1 of 12 November, of which
 I also attach a copy, on the same subject.

2. As you will see, Mr. Evans' despatch is well
 reasoned and holds out no prospect of a real improvement
 in Anglo-Iraqi relations in the near future. It is
 nevertheless slightly more sanguine about the outlook
 than the Secretary of State's despatch.

R. M. Evans

R. M. Evans
5 December, 1968

Very interesting. The prevailing
 factor (in every sense of the word!)
 is the Iraqi Army, and its
 attitudes are neither moderate nor
 pro-British. To me Iraq has
 looked for some years as a
 permanently military-ruled state.
 Our relations will therefore improve
 only very slowly and may
 be fractured again arbitrarily
 and suddenly. We should therefore
 be careful not to over-commit

ourselves diplomatically ("consulting" them about the Gulf) or by supplying arms (which would pass into Iraq in lands and ultimately into Israeli lands) or by over-persuading British firms to invest.

M
6/12

- 1) Mr. Arthur 10
12
- 2) N.E.D. Mr. Moore AM 19.12
- 3) Expt. Production Dpt (with 13) Mr. Makinson. R.E. 11/12

R.E. 579.
BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD
2. 17. 12/12
3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.
with paper.
AM7.
6.12.



(1/3)

SECRET

30 November 1968

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 15 - 5 - 11 - 1968
NEQ 3/548/1

(2) (1)

5

Mr dear Tony,

By something of a coincidence my despatch (1/3) of 23 November and your despatch (NEQ 3/1) of 12 November, both on our policy towards Iraq, crossed. I hope nevertheless that you will find the former, particularly the paragraphs dealing with oil and arms supply, of some use. The outlook for Lightnings, military communications and an air defence system is at the moment promising and a case may have to be made fairly soon for the granting of an Export Licence. I hope too that the paragraphs on the Gulf and Kurdistan are timely now that we know from secret sources that the Shah is thinking of calling a four-power conference, including Iraq, on the future of the Gulf. In this connection, perhaps you would care to glance again at my letter (1/8) of 14 September to Denis Allen.

EQ 3/11/26

(the reply to which was to sound a warning)

2. I am grateful for the clear and helpful instructions contained in your despatch. Your analysis of the present situation here is, if I may say so, as close to the mark as is humanly possible. Clearly, as long as present conditions in this country persist we are "unlikely to have any reliable basis for political friendship with Iraq". Whether we have to wait for "a new generation of Iraqis" remains to be seen. In the meantime, there is much work to be done.


3. As regards the specific courses of action listed in your despatch, I am particularly encouraged by the response of the British Council to the proposal for the re-opening of their Centre here. With luck the new Representative will be here before the end of the year, or at least early in January.

T. E. Evans
(T. E. Evans)

A. R. Moore, Esq., C.M.G.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.,
London, S.W.1.

SECRET

(25/2)



RESTRICTED

SEE ALSO
EQ 2/5.

BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

18 December 1968

6

M. de la Torre,

Resumption of Relations
With Iraq

① Enter
② Mr. Johnson
L.S. E.D. should see.
↑ mem
R.E. 3/12.

You will be glad to know that I have at last been able to hand over to Mr. Odhner, my Swedish colleague, the silver tray, the gift of H.M.G., suitably inscribed to record H.M.G.'s appreciation of his services during the period when he was responsible for the protection of British interests. For a variety of reasons, particularly Mr. Odhner's repeated absences, it was not possible to do it sooner.

2. I presented the tray at a small luncheon party which I gave in his honour today and which was attended by his Secretary of Embassy, some members of my staff and the Vice-President of the New British Club. Mr. Odhner was obviously most appreciative and asked me to convey his thanks to H.M.G.

3. I took the opportunity to present to his Secretary of Embassy, Mr. Bo Johnson, who is shortly leaving on transfer and who was immediately responsible for our interests in the period immediately before the resumption of relations, a suitably inscribed silver cigarette box of local workmanship. It had been subscribed for by members of the Embassy and the community.

4. The party was inevitably a small one - I am still in temporary accommodation - but was, I think, nonetheless enjoyable.

5. I am sending a copy of this letter to Archie Ross in Stockholm.

[Signature]
[Signature]
(T.E. Evans)

A.R. Moore, Esq., C.M.G.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.,
London, S.W.1.

RESTRICTED

Mr. Johnson
P.S. 13/1 O.V.
[Signature]
2/1

7.

NEQ 3/548/1.

9 January, 1969.

DESPATCHED BY
MINISTER OF STATE'S OFFICE

You may remember that we discussed the entry on Iraq in the Encyclopaedia Britannica when you brought your Ministerial visitors to see me last month.

I have myself looked up the article we discussed (I take it that the Minister was referring to the 1967 edition) and studied it in some detail. In general I think the articles and illustrations are quite good in the balance accorded to various aspects of Iraq, both in the text and in the illustrations. I am, however, writing to let the General Editor know of your understandable interest in this question.

R.E.
11/1.

Mr. Evans } to see
Mr. Morrison } o.r.
J.M. & B

(G. O. Roberts)

His Excellency Mr. Kadhim M. Khalaf,
21-22 Queen's Gate,
London S.W.7.

Registry
No. NEQ 3/548/1

DRAFT

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:—

His Excellency
Mr. Kadhim M. Khalaf,
21-22 Queen's Gate,
S.W.7.

From

Mr. Roberts
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

You may remember that we
discussed the entry on Iraq in the
Encyclopaedia Britannica when you
(from the Minister)
brought ~~some~~ visitors ~~from Baghdad~~ to
see me last month.

I have myself looked up the
~~article~~ we discussed (I take it that
the Minister was referring to the
1967 edition) and studied it in some
detail. In general I think the
articles and illustrations are quite
good in the balance accorded to various
aspects of Iraq, both in the text and
in the illustrations. I am, however,
writing to let the General Editor know
of your understandable interest in this
question.

DESPATCHED
MINISTER OF STATE'S OFFICE

Handwritten signature

Handwritten signature

Handwritten initials




ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA INTERNATIONAL, LTD.,

(INCORPORATED WITH LIMITED LIABILITY IN THE U.S.A.)

IMPERIAL HOUSE • 15-19 KINGSWAY • LONDON • W.C.2 • TELEPHONE: 01-836 1931 • TELEGRAMS: BRITANNICA LONDON W.C.2

Editorial Offices

Rt. Hon. Goronwy Roberts, M.P.,
Minister of State,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London S.W.1.



No reply needed.

Mr Roberts to see
NEQ
Mr. W. record of
Dec 1968

Rec'd 20/1

Dear Minister,

I am grateful to you for sending me a copy of your letter of January 14 addressed to Sir William Haley, the Editor-in-Chief, concerning the Iraqi Minister of Industry's criticisms of our article IRAQ in, I presume, the 1968 printing of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.

I am glad to note that you found the article reasonably balanced yourself and I think you will like to know that in the 1969 printing of the Encyclopaedia, which will be available in a few weeks, the article IRAQ has been revised and brought up to date in a number of respects. As soon as copies of this article are available I will send you one.

Yours faithfully,

Christopher Kent

C.H.W. Kent
Deputy Editor for London

CHWK/kz
cc: Sir William Haley

W. 7.




Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1



From The Minister of State

14 January, 1969.



It may be of interest for you to know that I received in the office a delegation of Iraqi visitors last month which included the Minister for Industry.

The Minister was critical of the article on Iraq in the most recent edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. I think he thought the article laid insufficient emphasis on Iraq's attempts to modernise her industry.

Having looked at the article myself I consider that it is fairly balanced and would not wish to make any critical comments myself. But I thought you might be interested to know that these remarks had been made by the Minister.

I am sending a copy of this letter to your London Editor, Mr. Kent.

(G. O. Roberts)

Sir William Haley,
Encyclopaedia Britannica Incorporated,
425 North Michigan Avenue,
CHICAGO,
Illinois.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry
No.

DRAFT Letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

To:—

Sir William Haley,
Encyclopaedia Britannica
Incorporated,
425 North Michigan Ave.,
Chicago,
Illinois.

From

Mr. Roberts
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

C.C.

Mr. C.H.W. Kent,
Encyclopaedia
Britannica
Incorporated,
Imperial House,
High Holborn,
London W.C.1.

It may be of interest for you to know
that I received ^{in two days} a delegation of Iraqi

visitors last month which included the
Minister for Industry.

The Minister was critical of the
article on Iraq in the most recent edition
of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. I think
he thought ~~emphasis~~ in the article laid
insufficient ^{emphasis} ~~weight~~ on Iraq's attempts to
modernise her industry.

Having looked at the article myself I
consider that it is fairly balanced and
would not wish to make any critical comments
myself. But I thought you might be interested
to know that these remarks had been made by
the Minister.

I am sending a copy of this letter to
your London Editor, Mr Kent.

13/11

CYPHER/CAT A
ROUTINE BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 31


CONFIDENTIAL
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
12 JANUARY 1969

TOP COPY ⁸
N/E
14/1

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELNO 31 OF 11 JANUARY, R F I SAVING TO AMMAN
BEIRUT CAIRO BAHRAIN RESIDENCY JEDDA KUWAIT TEL AVIV WASHINGTON AND
UKMIS NEW YORK.

I CALLED ON THE IRAQI MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MR. SHEIKHLY,
LAST NIGHT.



2. HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD INVITED THE MINISTER OF STATE, MR. ROBERTS,
TO VISIT BAGHDAD IN THE COURSE OF HIS FORTHCOMING TOUR IN THE
MIDDLE EAST. I HAD NOT THEN SEEN YOUR TELNO. 15 (NOT TO ALL).
I TOLD MR. SHEIKHLY THAT I WAS VERY PLEASED AND THAT I WAS SURE THAT
IF HE POSSIBLY COULD, MR. ROBERTS WOULD ACCEPT THE INVITATION.

3. HE SAID THAT THOUGH ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS HAD IMPROVED, THEY HAD
NOT IMPROVED QUICKLY ENOUGH. HE WAS PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS
TO SEE COOPERATION IN THE COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC FIELDS.

4. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN DISTRESSED TO SEE IN THE BRITISH PRESS MUCH
UNFOUNDED CRITICISM OF IRAQ, WHICH ONE PAPER HAD DESCRIBED AS A
QUOTE BLOODY COUNTRY UNQUOTE AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT H M G
WOULD DISCOURAGE IT. I POINTED OUT THAT FORTUNATELY THE PRESS IN
BRITAIN WAS FREE AND SUGGESTED THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT FOR THEIR
PART MIGHT ENCOURAGE BRITISH JOURNALISTS TO COME TO IRAQ TO SEE FOR
THEMSELVES. HE SAID THEY WOULD BE VERY WELCOME.

5. AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, HE SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT PALESTINE. HE SAID
THAT H M G'S ATTITUDE TO THE ISRAELI RAID ON BEIRUT AIRPORT HAD
BEEN FAR FROM CLEAR, NOT LEAST ON THE QUESTION OF COMPENSATION, AND
/ THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

THAT ARAB AMBASSADORS IN LONDON HAD BEEN DISSATISFIED. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE HAD ASKED THE UNDER-SECRETARY AT HIS MINISTRY TO SEE ME - PLEASE SEE MY TELNO. 562. HE WENT ON TO ASK WHAT WAS H M G'S ATTITUDE TO THE LATEST MOVES TO FIND A SOLUTION. THE JARRING MISSION HAD FAILED. AS REGARDS THE 1968 NOVEMBER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY WAS UNCONDITIONAL.

5. I STRONGLY DENIED THAT H M G'S ATTITUDE TO THE BEIRUT RAID HAD NOT BEEN CLEAR. H M G HAD STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE RAID AS THEY CONDEMNED ALL USE OF FORCE : THEY HAD VOTED FOR THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE, THOUGH THE COMPENSATION ISSUE WAS OBVIOUSLY VERY COMPLICATED. MR. JARRING WAS CONTINUING HIS EFFORTS AND HIS MISSION HAD THUS NOT FAILED. THE POWERS WERE AGREED THAT IT OFFERED THE BEST HOPE AND WERE GIVING IT ALL SUPPORT. AS REGARDS THE 1968. RESOLUTION, IT OFFERED A BASIS FOR A FAIR SETTLEMENT. WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL WAS ONLY ONE SIDE OF THE COIN : THE ARABS WERE CALLED UPON TO END THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY, TO ENSURE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION, ETC. SPEAKING VERY (?GP OMITTED) I SAID THAT HAVING SPENT OVER 30 YEARS IN ARAB COUNTRIES, I FEARED ANOTHER QUOTE DISASTER UNQUOTE FOR THE ARABS IF THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY WERE LOST. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT IN THE LONG RUN THE ARABS WOULD WIN : HE HAD NO PROPOSALS FOR THE INTERVENING PERIOD.

6. AT ONE POINT, MR. SHEIKHLY ASKED WHY H M G HAD BANNED THE SALE OF ARMS TO JORDAN WHOSE TIES WITH THE U K WERE SO CLOSE. I SAID THAT IT WAS HIS FRENCH FRIENDS WHO HAD INTERRUPTED THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO JORDAN AND TO OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES (AS WELL AS TO ISRAEL.) THE U K CONTINUES TO MAKE ARMS AVAILABLE TO JORDAN. INDEED THE IRAQI MINISTER OF DEFENCE WAS ALSO NEGOTIATING TO PURCHASE FROM THE U K. (MR. SHEIKLY WAS ANXIOUS TO KNOW WHETHER THE SALES WOULD BE APPROVED BY H M G AND I DID NOT, OF COURSE, COMMIT MYSELF.)

CONFIDENTIAL

/.....7. I HAVE

CONFIDENTIAL

BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO.31 TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

-3-

7. I HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY WHAT THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SAID ON THE SUBJECT OF IRAQI OIL - PLEASE SEE MY TELNO. 19 (NOT TO ALL).

8. FINALLY, MR. SHEIKHLY SAID HE HAD BEEN VERY IMPRESSED BY THE CORDIAL RECEPTION GIVEN TO HIS COLLEAGUES THE MINISTERS OF INDUSTRY AND PLANNING DURING THEIR RECENT VISIT TO THE U K AND THAT HE ATTACHED THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THE FORTHCOMING VISIT OF THE C O M E T MISSION TO BAGHDAD.

F C O PASS SAVING TO AMMAN BEIRUT CAIRO BAHRAIN RESIDENCY
JEDDA KUWAIT TEL AVIV WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MR. EVANS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

N. EASTERN DEPT
N. AFRICAN DEPT
ARABIAN DEPT
NEWS DEPT
UNITED NATIONS DEPT
DEFENCE POLICY DEPT
P. U. S. D.

~~~~~

CONFIDENTIAL



CYPHER/CAT A  
ROUTINE BAGHDAD  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 31


CONFIDENTIAL  
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
12 JANUARY 1969

TOP COPY  
8  
N/C  
P. 2  
Jm 14/1

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELNO 31 OF 11 JANUARY, R F I SAVING TO AMMAN  
BEIRUT CAIRO BAHRAIN RESIDENCY JEDDA KUWAIT TEL AVIV WASHINGTON AND  
UKMIS NEW YORK.

I CALLED ON THE IRAQI MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MR. SHEIKHLY,  
LAST NIGHT.



2. HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD INVITED THE MINISTER OF STATE, MR. ROBERTS,  
TO VISIT BAGHDAD IN THE COURSE OF HIS FORTHCOMING TOUR IN THE  
MIDDLE EAST. I HAD NOT THEN SEEN YOUR TELNO. 15 ( NOT TO ALL).  
I TOLD MR. SHEIKHLY THAT I WAS VERY PLEASED AND THAT I WAS SURE THAT  
IF HE POSSIBLY COULD, MR. ROBERTS WOULD ACCEPT THE INVITATION.

3. HE SAID THAT THOUGH ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS HAD IMPROVED, THEY HAD  
NOT IMPROVED QUICKLY ENOUGH. HE WAS PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS  
TO SEE COOPERATION IN THE COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC FIELDS.

4. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN DISTRESSED TO SEE IN THE BRITISH PRESS MUCH  
UNFOUNDED CRITICISM OF IRAQ, WHICH ONE PAPER HAD DESCRIBED AS A  
QUOTE BLOODY COUNTRY UNQUOTE AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT H M G  
WOULD DISCOURAGE IT. I POINTED OUT THAT FORTUNATELY THE PRESS IN  
BRITAIN WAS FREE AND SUGGESTED THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT FOR THEIR  
PART MIGHT ENCOURAGE BRITISH JOURNALISTS TO COME TO IRAQ TO SEE FOR  
THEMSELVES. HE SAID THEY WOULD BE VERY WELCOME.

5. AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, HE SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT PALESTINE. HE SAID  
THAT H M G'S ATTITUDE TO THE ISRAELI RAID ON BEIRUT AIRPORT HAD  
BEEN FAR FROM CLEAR, NOT LEAST ON THE QUESTION OF COMPENSATION, AND  
/ THAT

CONFIDENTIAL



RESTRICTED

~~TOP SECRET~~

9  
NEQ 3/548/1  
Action  
copy  
(NE) NEQ 18/3

CYPHER CAT/A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 13

TO BAGHDAD  
9 JANUARY 1969  
(NE)

RESTRICTED.

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HERE HAVE JUST TOLD US OF A REPORT WHICH REACHED THE STATE DEPARTMENT YESTERDAY VIA THE BELGIANS THAT FIVE AMERICAN WIVES HAVE BEEN ARRESTED. OF THESE FOUR ARE THE WIVES OF IRAQIS BUT THE FIFTH IS SAID TO BE THE WIFE OF A BRITISH U.N. OFFICIAL SERVING IN IRAQ CALLED, WE BELIEVE, HELEN STAINBURN.

2. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD INVESTIGATE THIS REPORT URGENTLY. IF IT IS ACCURATE YOU SHOULD DO WHAT YOU CAN TO SECURE MRS. STAINBURN'S RELEASE AT LEAST ON BAIL.

3. IT IS NOT CLEAR IF THE AMERICANS WILL ASK THE BELGIANS TO PROTEST BUT CLEARLY THEY WILL BE HINDERED BY THE FACT THAT THE WIVES' IRAQI NATIONALITY WILL PREVAIL. PLEASE THEREFORE SPEAK TO YOUR BELGIAN COLLEAGUE AND, IF YOU JUDGE IT APPROPRIATE, THEN SPEAK TO THE IRAQIS ON BEHALF OF THE FOUR OTHER AMERICAN WIVES.

STEWART

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
NR. EAST. D.  
CONSULAR D.  
COMM. & OIL D.

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

*Action Copy*  
*NEQ 18/3*

10 ~~10~~ COPY

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno. 23

10 January, 1969

|                                                              |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| RECEIVED IN<br>ARCHIVES No. 15<br>13 JAN 1969<br>NEQ 3/548/1 |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|

RESTRICTED

⑨  
Your telegram No. 13 of 9 January: Arrest of American Women.

The American women together with other men, women and children of different nationalities were detained when the International School, formerly the American Community School, was closed by the Iraqi authorities on 7 January. Those detained were the teachers, the children and some parents; all, including Mrs. Stainbarn, were released later the same day with the possible exception of one Mrs. Derwish, an American teacher married to an Iraqi. We are making enquiries about her.

Mr. Evans.

*P.A.*  
*Jm*  
*12/1*

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
Near Eastern Dept.  
Consular Dept.  
Commodities & Oil Dept.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

RESTRICTED

XXXXXX



RESTRICTED

(11)

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE  
AND THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR HELD AT THE FOREIGN AND  
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, ON TUESDAY, 7 JANUARY,

AT 11.00 A.M.

|                                                                     |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| RECEIVED IN<br>1969<br>ARCHIVES No.15<br>15 JAN 1969<br>NEQ 3/548/1 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|

Present:

The Rt. Hon. Goronwy  
Roberts, M.P.

H.E. Mr. Kadhim M. Khalaf

Mr. A.C.D.S. MacRae

The Iraqi Ambassador opened by saying that he had received instructions from his government the previous day to invite Mr. Roberts to visit Baghdad during his forthcoming tour of Arab countries. He considered that this was an important suggestion at the present critical point in Middle East affairs. Mr. Roberts said that he warmly appreciated this kind of invitation, but feared that it was impossible, in view of previous commitments, for him to extend his tour any further. The Iraqi Ambassador repeated that as this was such an important juncture in the Arab/Israel situation, and also since he thought that no British Minister had visited Baghdad since 1958, he hoped nevertheless that Mr. Roberts could consider this invitation seriously. Mr. Roberts replied that he deeply appreciated the warm feeling revealed by the invitation; but that it was not possible to add even two or three days to his tour on this occasion. However, he looked forward to the possibility of visiting Iraq at some future date.

2. The Iraqi Ambassador then asked if he might have a short tour d'horizon on the Middle East situation. Mr. Roberts described the recent call of the Soviet Ambassador on the Secretary of State and went over our initial reactions to the Soviet approach which he described as being not so much a definitive plan for a settlement, as an attempt to put a new sense of urgency into the efforts already being made towards a settlement. He said he hoped that any new steps would be closely related to the Mission of Dr. Jarring and the United Nations Resolution, and added that the Soviet Union apparently agreed with this view.

/ 3. ...

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

3. The Iraqi Ambassador then raised the question of the French arms embargo. In this context, he urged that France, Britain and the U.S.S.R. should jointly bring pressure to bear on Israel to adopt a more flexible position. He asked if the time had not come for Britain to take a more forthright line to impress upon Israel the urgent need to make the compromises necessary for a peaceful settlement. Mr. Roberts replied that he was sure that the policy which Britain had adopted over the last year and a half had been the right one. We had slowly restored our good relations with the Arab countries; but had refrained from too direct an intervention in Middle East Affairs which might be interpreted as neo-colonialism. Rather, we had done our utmost to bring about an end to the state of tension in the area by means of suggestion. This had been the case over the U.N. Resolution of 22 November 1967 which remained the basis of the present efforts to find a solution. By pursuing an even-handed approach, we were in a position to talk freely to both sides in the dispute, and thus contribute usefully to the efforts to end the crisis.

4. The Iraqi Ambassador asked whether the British Government had made representations to Israel over the present state of tension on the Israel/Lebanon border. Mr. Roberts assured him that we had expressed our concern to the Israelis. At the same time, we had continued to advise Arab countries to do all they could to discourage fedayeen raids which could only provoke more incidents. When finally the Iraqi Ambassador raised the question of a meeting of the Four Powers to discuss the implementation of the U.N. Resolution, Mr. Roberts said that while there had been a number of bilateral meetings, there were no plans at present for any formal four-power principle out of hand, but took a pragmatic view of it.

*Meeting. We did not  
reject the*

**Distributed to:**

Chancery: Baghdad  
Beirut  
Amman  
Cairo  
Tel Aviv

NED Files  
Mr. Roberts' Office  
Mr. Arthur  
N.A.D.  
Arabian Dept.  
News Dept.



. N.E.O. files

W/11.

Record of conversation between the Minister  
of State and the Iraqi Ambassador held at the  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, on Tuesday,  
7 January, 1969 at 11.00 a.m.

We apologise for the fact that a line was missed  
out of this record. Could you please correct it  
as follows :


Paragraph 4, second line from the end, after  
'for any formal' insert 'four-power meeting.  
We did not reject the'

|                                                             |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| RECEIVED IN<br>ARCHIVES No.15<br>10 JAN 1969<br>NLR 3/548/1 |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|



R.E.

Mr. Stow,  
Protocol and Conference Department



Summoning of Iraqi Ambassador by  
Mr. Roberts

Further to our telephone conversation of yesterday afternoon about how to get hold of the Iraqi Ambassador, it may be useful for you to have his private telephone number which was eventually vouchsafed to this office by a reluctant GPO: 229 6430. This is a change from the previous Bayswater number which you have.

2. From the Ambassador's servants I also managed to get the numbers of the two Counsellors which are:

Mr. Shekhly - AMB 5141  
Mr. Wahid - FRE 4706

3. In view of the difficulty experienced in getting hold of the Ambassador (I eventually managed to contact him about 18.30) I wonder whether it might be worth giving consideration to the compilation of a list of the private telephone numbers of Ambassadors and senior members of their staffs. This would be particularly worthwhile if there are other Embassies which close, like the Iraqis, as early as 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and refuse to print the private numbers of their staffs in the "Diplomatic List".

Copies:

✓ NED

Private  
Secretary

(H.D.A.C. Miers)  
Private Secretary to  
Minister of State  
14 January, 1969



RESTRICTED

13.

Mr. Miers *Minted State*  
*has seen*


Mr. Roberts will be seeing Mr. Khallaf tomorrow on the subject of the Iraqi Jews.

H.M. Ambassador, Baghdad, has asked if Iraqi delay in granting permission for the I.P.C. to sell a house for use as an Embassy residence, could be raised with the Iraqi Ambassador. Mr. Khallaf's call provides an opportunity, and we should be grateful if Mr. Roberts would mention the matter. Accommodation Department concur.

*D. J. Makinson*

(D. J. Makinson)  
Near Eastern Dept.  
13 January, 1969

c.c. Mr. David Roberts,  
Accommodation Dept.



RESTRICTED



CYPHER/CAT A  
ROUTINE BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 29 11 JANUARY 1969  
CONFIDENTIAL.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 3: RESIDENCE.

*Separate memo  
D.M.  
13/1*

1. I SAW MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THIS EVENING AND ASKED FOR HIS HELP POINTING OUT THAT IN VIEW OF ARRIVAL OF COMET MISSION AT END OF MONTH, MATTER WAS URGENT. HE SAID THAT UNFORTUNATELY MINISTER OF OIL HAD REPORTED THAT HIS MINISTRY REQUIRED PROPERTY AND THAT A HOSPITAL WOULD BE BUILT ON AN ADJACENT SITE. HE WAS READY TO LET ME HAVE ANY OTHER HOUSE IN BAGHDAD.

2. I DELIBERATELY LOST MY TEMPER. I SAID THAT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER HAD MONTHS AGO SAID THAT HE WOULD GLADLY MAKE PROPERTY AVAILABLE AND THAT I WOULD REPORT TO YOU THAT IN CIRCUMSTANCES I WAS UNABLE TO CARRY OUT ADEQUATELY MY DUTIES AS H.M. REPRESENTATIVE IN BAGHDAD. I SAID THAT AFTER SEVEN MONTHS I WAS SURE THAT THERE WAS NO OTHER SUITABLE RESIDENCE AND THAT IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY TAKE A COUPLE OF YEARS TO BUILD.

3. MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHO SEEMED SYMPATHETIC, SAID THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS MATTER URGENTLY WITH GENERAL TIKRITI ON HIS RETURN TO BAGHDAD IN A FEW DAYS TIME.

4. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF IRAQ AMBASSADOR COULD BE ASKED TO INFORM HIS GOVERNMENT OF YOUR INTEREST IN THIS MATTER. THEY MIGHT BE REMINDED THAT IT WAS THEIR FAILURE TO PROTECT EMBASSY IN 1958 THAT LED TO PRESENT SITUATION, WHERE H.M. REPRESENTATIVE IN BAGHDAD HAS NO RESIDENCE,

MR EVANS

FILES  
ACCOMMODATION DEPT.  
MR. WILKINSON  
MR. LARMOUR  
COMMODITIES & OIL DEPT.  
NEAR EASTERN DEPT.

XXXXXX

CONFIDENTIAL



Mr Arthur

This is for you

RMB

FILE COPY.

14

NEQ 3/548/1.

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE IRAQI MINISTERS OF INDUSTRY AND  
PLANNING, AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COUNCIL OF  
THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND AT THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH  
OFFICE AT 11.50 A.M. ON WEDNESDAY, 18 DECEMBER

Present:

The Rt. Hon. G.O. Roberts  
M.P.

Mr. Khalid Hashimi (Minister  
of Industry)

Mr. D. J. Makinson

Dr. Jawad Hashim (Minister  
of Planning)

Mr. Shaffiq Mahmudi al-Daraji  
(Secretary General of the  
Council of the Revolutionary  
Command)

H.E. Mr. Kadhim M. Khallaf

Mr. Roberts welcomed the visitors. He referred to the mutual goodwill and knowledge between Iraq and Britain. He hoped that the visitors would ask any questions they liked. For his part he had two small points he wished to raise. The first was the attack in the Baghdad paper al-Thawra of the 9th of December on the B.B.C. for relying exclusively on the Israel radio for its account of the attacks on Iraqi troops in Jordan. In fact the B.B.C. had quoted both Tel Aviv and Baghdad. Tel Aviv was first on the air so they quoted Tel Aviv first. He would give Mr. Khallaf a piece of paper with the script of the B.B.C. broadcasts.

Mr. Khallaf said that he in turn would like to raise the matter of the B.B.C. Some three weeks ago [it was actually more, 22 October] the Iraqi Embassy were told at noon that there would be a film about Kurdistan in the evening. Mr. Khallaf had spoken to Sir Denis Allen, who had said that the B.B.C. were an independent body and that any intervention by the Foreign Office would not help. Mr. Khallaf particularly objected to the short notice.

Mr. Roberts said he took note of the point about the short notice, and agreed that it would have been a courtesy for the B.B.C. to have let the Iraqi Ambassador know in plenty of time. The B.B.C. were an independent body and it was their practice to paint both sides of the picture.

Mr. Khallaf said there were not two separate points of view. There was not a Kurdish Government and an Iraqi Government. This was an internal matter for the Iraqi government. As for public opinion he was confused by the relative attention paid to different subjects. There was a tremendous fuss about the Falkland Islands but the Arab cause was given little room in the newspapers.



Mr. Roberts pointed out that whatever space the newspapers might give to the matter, it was certainly true to say that the Arab/Israel problem commanded as much or more attention in Parliament than the Falkland Islands. Kurdistan had not been discussed in Parliament because, as Mr. Khallaf had said, it was an internal matter.

Mr. Hashimi said he had three small points which he would like to raise. [In the conversation they were interspersed with other matters but they are listed seriatim here]

- (1) He had looked in the Encyclopaedia Britannica to brief himself on the British view of Iraq. It had a large piece on Barzani and his Kurdish adventures in the 1967 edition but no mention of the New Iraq's progress.

Mr. Roberts undertook to look at the article and to see what ought to be done.

- (2) He was disappointed at the discrepancy between the facts of social development in his country, closure of prisons, the guarantee of civil liberties, the improvements in education; and the accounts of Iraq in the British press. The British press always seemed to lay stress on minor unimportant instances which might not be understood in Britain, but were in accordance with local custom.

Mr. Roberts wondered whether there might not be advantage in inviting journalists to hear the Iraqi point of view at the Embassy. It was in his own opinion and that of the British Government, that it would be an excellent thing if more information about Iraq and her progress were available for the British press.

Mr. Hashimi said that his third point was about negotiations between the I.P.C. and the Iraqi Government. There were matters of substance pending and he hoped that quite apart from the rights and wrongs of the case, funds would be found to assist social progress and to avoid subversion by Communists in Iraq.

[At this point the Ambassador passed a note round the table to Mr. Hashimi and he concluded his remarks]

Mr. Roberts said that he too hoped that talks between Iraq and the I.P.C. would continue. Her Majesty's Government would like to see a solution but could not intervene. He hoped that the Iraqi Government would recognise that old "imperialist" practices had changed, and it should be possible to arrive at a solution under the new conditions of cooperation between equals. He believed that an I.P.C. representative was going out to Iraq in the near future, and he hoped that advantage would be taken of the occasion.



The new relationship between Iraq and Britain was promising: as the Secretary of State had said we were interested in trade, and he had told Mr. Dally of the I.P.C. that he hoped something would come of the I.P.C. representative's visit.

Mr. Khallaf took up Mr. Roberts' earlier comment and said that he had in fact begun talks with the press; the Embassy had sent material to the newspapers but it was not used. There had recently been quite a sizeable meeting of the Committee for Anglo/Arab understanding attended by more than 600 people at which the U.A.R. Ambassador, the Jordanian Ambassador, Mr. Christopher Mayhew and Mr. Anthony Nutting had spoken. There had been no mention in any of the papers except one line in the Daily Telegraph. The Arabs started at a disadvantage.

Mr. Roberts then raised the question of Mrs. Wilson's pension. He understood that the matter had now been agreed by Ministers. Mrs. Wilson had heard nothing, however; perhaps Mr. Khallaf would let him know when payments were to be resumed.

Mr. Khallaf said that this pension, and others, had been cut off "for administrative reasons". A decision had now been taken by the Council of Ministers [Dr. Hashim seemed to know of the matter and nodded assent]. He would certainly let Mr. Roberts know when payment was to be resumed. Mr. Khallaf thanked Mr. Roberts on behalf of the visitors. The discussion was marked by considerable cordiality.



Distribution

Sir Denis Allen

~~Mr. Burroughs~~ Mr Arthur.

Mr. Maitland

Mr. McCarthy

Mr. Richard Evans

Mr. Fearnley

U.N. Department

Chanceries at:-

Washington

Baghdad

Cairo

Tel Aviv

Tehran

Amman

Bahrain (Political Residency)



**CONFIDENTIAL**

15

NEQ 3/548/1

23 January, 1969.

**Minister of State's Visits to Middle East**

I believe that when you were in London recently the Iraqi Ambassador raised with you the question of a provisional date for a visit by Mr. Goronwy Roberts to Baghdad, and that you spoke to the Department about this.

2. After raising the matter with Mr. Roberts' office, we have come to the conclusion that it would be wiser at this stage to go no further than to repeat that Mr. Roberts thanks the Iraq Government for their invitation and hopes to be able to visit Iraq, but cannot yet give even a provisional date.

(G. G. ARTHUR)

His Excellency Mr. Trefor Evans, C.M.G., O.B.E.,  
BAGHDAD.

**CONFIDENTIAL**







Mr. Arthur

Minister of State's Visits to Middle East

I attach a draft.

  
(D. J. Makinson)  
Near Eastern Department  
22 January, 1969.





NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

WIB'L 51-7433

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |                                   |                                                      |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| <u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                                   |                                                      |
| Registry<br>No. NEQ                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | DRAFT letter                      | Type 1 +                                             |
| SECURITY CLASSIFICATION                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | To:—                              | From                                                 |
| Top Secret.<br>Secret.<br>Confidential.<br><del>Restricted.</del><br>Unclassified. <i>Jm 22/1</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | Mr. Trefor Evans,<br><br>Baghdad. | Mr. Arthur<br>Telephone No. & Ext.<br><br>Department |
| PRIVACY MARKING                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |                                   |                                                      |
| In Confidence                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                   |                                                      |
| <p><u>Minister of State's Visits to Middle East</u></p> <p>I believe that when you were in London recently the Iraqi Ambassador raised with you the question of a <del>possible</del> provisional date for a visit by Mr. Goronwy Roberts to Baghdad, and that you spoke to the Department about this.</p> <p>2. After raising the matter with Mr. Roberts' office, we have come to the conclusion that it would be wiser at this stage to go no further than to <sup>repeat</sup> <del>say</del> that Mr. Roberts thanks the <sup>Iraq</sup> <del>Government</del> for their invitation and hopes to be able to visit Iraq, but cannot yet <sup>even</sup> give a provisional date.</p> <p><i>E</i></p> |                                   |                                                      |

CONFIDENTIAL



Mr. EvansBritish Policy towards Iraq

Mr. Trefor Evans letter 1/3 of 30 November agrees, by implication, with the main points made in our despatch NEQ 3/1 f.1 of 12 November. It raises once again, the possibility of discussions between Britain and Iraq on the Gulf (last sentence of paragraph 1) and refers to Mr. Trefor Evans' letter 1/8 of 14 September. This letter has, however, already been answered in specific terms by Sir Denis Allen's letter of 7 October, Mr. McCarthy's letter B 3/18 of 11 September, and Mr. Morris' letter 2/31 of 10 October. There is a clear difference between discussions as a result of the Shah's initiative, and discussions because the Iraqis want to be in on the act.

2. I do not recommend further action.

Mr. Makinson. 29/1

(D. J. Makinson)  
23 January, 1969.

I agree. In any case, the letter is rather too old to be answered now.  
2. I suggest that you or Mr. Hinchcliffe might show Mr. Acland the correspondence between Mr. Evans and Sir D. Allen about consulting the Iraqis over developments in the Gulf. SECRET

By. to Mr. Acland 22 Feb 21/2  
R.E. 28/1.



FOLIO (17),

TRANSFERRED

TO NEQ 9/1



18

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.15  
24 JAN 1969  
NEQ 3/548/1



BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

18 January, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

I have submitted  
on both the points.

Reg 2 p. 1.

Don 23/


Mr dear Donald,

done

Done

I shall, of course, be glad to hear from  
you in due course whether the Minister of State  
has been able to fix a provisional date for his  
visit to Baghdad as suggested by Khalaf; also  
whether the business of the Russian  
communication has been cleared up to Khalaf's  
satisfaction.

2. I am glad we were able to have a chat.

  
(T.E. Evans)

D.J. Makinson, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.,  
London, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL



NEQ 3/548/1 (19)

TOP COPY

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 71

TO BAGHDAD  
28 JANUARY 1969  
(NEAR EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL

EXECUTIONS:

THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR HAS JUST TELEPHONED IN A STATE OF SOME EMOTION TO MY PRIVATE SECRETARY, WHO IS AN OLD ACQUAINTANCE. KHALAF SAID THAT HE HAD JUST BEEN SPEAKING ON THE TELEPHONE TO THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER. THE LATTER HAD ASKED HIM TO PROTEST ABOUT THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE NEWS DEPARTMENT AT 12.30 P.M. TODAY. THIS WAS INTERFERENCE IN IRAQI INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

2. KHALAF WENT ON TO SAY THAT THREE TV CAMERAS HAD BEEN OUTSIDE HIS EMBASSY SINCE THIS MORNING AND HE WISHED TO PROTEST ABOUT A DEMONSTRATION WHICH HE HAD BEEN WARNED WOULD TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE HIS EMBASSY AT 7.30 P.M. TODAY. HIS FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TOLD HIM TO SAY THAT IF THIS DEMONSTRATION TOOK PLACE, HE COULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT MIGHT FOLLOW IN IRAQ. WHEN MY PRIVATE SECRETARY ASKED KHALAF TO REPEAT THIS LAST PHRASE SLOWLY SO THAT HE COULD TAKE IT DOWN, KHALAF BEGAN TO BACKTRACK. HE SAID HIS FOREIGN MINISTER'S INTENTION WAS THAT IN THE EVENT OF A DEMONSTRATION IN LONDON, HE COULD NOT ANTICIPATE WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IN IRAQ.

MAITLAND SAID THAT CITIZENS OF THIS COUNTRY WERE FULLY ENTITLED TO DEMONSTRATE, AS THE AMBASSADOR HIMSELF MUST KNOW FROM HIS OWN OBSERVATIONS. THEY HAD NO RIGHT, HOWEVER, TO BREAK THE LAW. WAS THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTING THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD TRY TO STOP THE DEMONSTRATION? THIS THEY WOULD HAVE NO RIGHT TO DO. KHALAF GAVE NO CLEAR ANSWER.

3. AFTER INFORMING ME OF THIS CONVERSATION, MY PRIVATE SECRETARY SPOKE AGAIN TO THE AMBASSADOR. HE SAID, ON MY INSTRUCTIONS, THAT I HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THE PROTEST ABOUT OUR STATEMENT AND MIGHT WISH TO COMMENT ON THIS PROTEST AT A LATER STAGE. AS REGARDS THE ANTICIPATED DEMONSTRATION, THE AMBASSADOR'S INFORMATION HAD BEEN PASSED TO THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT FULLY ACCEPTED THEIR OBLIGATION TO PROTECT THE LIVES AND PROPERTY

/ OF FOREIGNERS

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

OF FOREIGNERS IN THIS COUNTRY. I WISHED MR. KHALAF TO CONVEY BY THE FASTEST MEANS TO HIS FOREIGN MINISTER THAT I HELD HIM EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROTECTION OF BRITISH LIVES AND PROPERTY IN IRAQ. IN A FURTHER EFFORT TO BACKTRACK KHALAF SAID THAT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER WAS PROBABLY SUGGESTING THAT IF A DEMONSTRATION TOOK PLACE IN LONDON, A SIMILAR DEMONSTRATION MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN BAGHDAD. WERE WE OBJECTING TO THAT? MAITLAND SAID THAT HE COULD ONLY SPEAK OF DEMONSTRATIONS IN THIS COUNTRY. IF IT WERE THE LAW IN IRAQ THAT PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS WERE ALLOWED, THEN NO ONE COULD OBJECT. IT WAS PRESUMABLY AGAINST THE LAW IN IRAQ FOR DEMONSTRATORS TO RESORT TO VIOLENCE. THE AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED THIS.

STEWART

FCO/WH DISTRIBUTION:

NEAR EASTERN DEPT

~~~~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

Near Eastern

• Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s)

B

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~Top Secret~~
~~Secret~~
Confidential
~~Restricted~~
~~Unclassified~~

PRIORITY MARKINGS

~~Flash~~
~~Immediate~~
~~Priority~~
Routine

(Date)

28/1

Despatched

1724

A

CYPHER

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

~~En Clatr.~~
~~Code~~
Cypher

[Security classification
—if any]

CONFIDENTIAL

[Privacy marking
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]


Addressed to BAGHDAD

telegram No. (date)

And to

repeated for information to

Saving to

Executions

Draft Telegram to:—

X BAGHDAD

No. 71

(Date) 28/1

And to:—

Repeat to:—

Saving to:—

Distribution:—

FCO Whitehall

Entered
Near EasternDept.
Copies to:—

The Iraqi Ambassador has just telephoned
in a state of some emotion to my Private
Secretary, who is an old acquaintance.

Khalaf said that he had ^{just} been speaking on the
telephone to the Iraqi Foreign Minister.

The latter had asked him to protest about the
statement issued by the News Department at
12.30 p.m. today. This was interference in
Iraqi internal affairs.

2. Khalaf went on to say that three TV
cameras had been outside his Embassy since
/this morning

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

16352
29/12

CONFIDENTIAL

8

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

this morning and he wished to protest about a demonstration which he had been warned would take place outside his Embassy at 7.30 p.m. today. His Foreign Minister had told him to say that if this demonstration took place, he could not be responsible for what might follow in Iraq. When my Private Secretary asked Khalaf to repeat this last phrase slowly so that he could take it down, Khalaf began to backtrack. He said his Foreign Minister's intention was that in the event of a demonstration in London, he could not anticipate what might happen in Iraq. Maitland said that citizens of this country were fully entitled to demonstrate, as the Ambassador himself must know from his own observations. They had no right, however, to break the law. Was the Ambassador suggesting that the Government should try to stop the demonstration? This they would have no right to do. Khalaf gave no clear answer.

3. After informing me of this conversation, my Private Secretary spoke again to the Ambassador. He said, on my instructions, that I had taken note

/of the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

of the protest about our statement and might wish to comment on this protest at a later stage. As regards the anticipated demonstration, the Ambassador's information had been passed to the appropriate authorities.

Her Majesty's Government fully accepted their obligation to protect the lives and property of foreigners in this country. I wished Mr. Khalaf to convey by ^{the} fastest means to his Foreign Minister that I held him equally responsible for the protection of British lives and property in Iraq.

In a further effort to backtrack Khalaf said that his Foreign Minister was probably suggesting that if ~~the~~ a demonstration took place in London, a similar demonstration might take place in Baghdad. Were we objecting to that? Maitland said that he could only speak of demonstrations in this country.

If it were the law in Iraq that peaceful demonstrations were allowed, then no one could object. It was presumably against the law in Iraq for demonstrators to resort to violence. The Ambassador confirmed this.

Sh 25

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

TOP COPY

En Clair

FLASH BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno 102 29 January, 1969


UNCLASSIFIED

NE
Pg 29/1

From Hawley.

Demonstrations of some magnitude are now taking place outside Embassy. The crowds so far are mainly students. They are shouting slogans such as "Britain is against the Arabs", "we do not want your Embassy" and "close the Embassy". Police are outside the gates in force and so far have things under control.

2. The Ambassador has not yet got in and may find it difficult to do so. He is calling on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to request adequate protection.



Mr. Evans.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N. East. Dept.
Arab. Dept.
News Dept.
N. Afr. Dept.
Cons Dept.
Emergency Unit
Personnel Dept.
Comms Dept.
D.W.S.
U.N.D.
Def. Pol. Dept.
P.U.S.D.
DIS MOD

ADVANCE COPIES SENT



Folio ②1

TRANSFERRED

TO NEQ $18/2$

TOP COPY

(22)

NEQ 3/548/1

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 70

TO BAGHDAD

28 JANUARY 1969
(NEAR EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 70 OF 28 JANUARY AND TO
AMMAN TEHRAN.

IRAQI EXECUTIONS

MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM (NOT TO ALL) DESCRIBES A
CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR AND MY PRIVATE SECRETARY
THIS AFTERNOON.

2. YOU SHOULD KNOW AT ONCE THAT DEMONSTRATIONS MAY WELL BE
ORGANISED AGAINST YOUR EMBASSY THIS EVENING.

STEWART.

FCO/WH DISTRIBUTION:

NEAR EASTERN DEPT

~~~~~

CONFIDENTIAL



Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

Near Eastern

\* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should  
reach addressee(s)

A

## SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

## PRIORITY MARKINGS

~~Top Secret~~  
~~Secret~~  
Confidential  
~~Restricted~~  
Unclassified

~~Flash~~  
~~Immediate~~ } \*  
Priority  
Routine

(Date)

Despatched

CYRIL

## PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

[Security classification  
—if any]

Confidential

[Privacy marking  
—if any]

~~En Clair.~~  
~~Code~~  
Cypher

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to BAGHDAD


telegram No. 70 (date)

28 January

And to Amman

repeated for information to

Saving to



Draft Telegram to:—

BAGHDAD

No. 70

(Date) 28/1

And to:—

Repeat to:—

Amman

Telegram

Immediate

Iraqi Executions

(not to all)

My immediately following telegram describes  
a conversation between the Iraqi Ambassador  
and my Private Secretary this afternoon.

2. You should know at once ~~[of the possibility]~~  
that demonstrations may <sup>well</sup> be organised against  
your Embassy this evening.

Saving to:—

Distribution:—

FEO/whi

Copies to:—

28 25  
1

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

1635-2  
28/1/6



EN CLAIR

TOP COPY

(23)

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 103

29 JANUARY 1969

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 103 OF 29 JAN RFI BOARD OF TRADE.  
FROM HAWLEY.

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED A SMALL ORGANISED DELEGATION WHO  
SUBMITTED A PETITION FROM +THE ASSEMBLED ARAB MASSES+ PROTESTING  
AT THE +SHAMEFUL BIASED ATTITUDE TAKEN BY THE BRITISH  
AUTHORITIES TOWARDS THE EXECUTION OF TRAITORS AND SPIES, THE  
AGENTS OF ISRAEL +. BRITAIN, IT CONTENDS, HAS IGNORED THE  
BARBAROUS CRIMES AND BLOODY SLAUGHTERS CARRIED OUT IN OCCUPIED  
ARAB TERRITORY.

2. HEAD OF PROTOCOL HAS ALSO FORMALLY ASKED US TO +POSTPONE+  
THE VISIT OF THE COMET MISSION. PLEASE INFORM THEM  
ACCORDINGLY.

MR. EVANS

/COPIES SENT TO B.O.T.

Na 30/

|                                               |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| RECEIVED IN<br>ARCHIVES No. 15<br>29 JAN 1969 |
| NEQ 3/548/1                                   |

FCO/WHI. DISTRIBUTION

*Near Eastern Dept.*

ADVANCE COPIES SENT



EN CLAIR

TOP COPY


(24)

PRIORITY BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELNO 104  
UNCLASSIFIED

29 JANUARY 1969

MY TELEGRAM NO. 103.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PETITION.  
BEGINS.



NE

Reg  
30/1

WE THE POPULAR MASSES ASSEMBLED HERE ANNOUNCE OUR GREAT RESENTMENT AT THE SHAMEFUL BIASED ATTITUDE TAKEN BY THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES TOWARDS THE QUESTION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE TRAITORS AND SPIES, THE AGENTS OF ISRAEL.

2. BRITAIN'S ATTITUDE IS NOT NEW TO THE ARABS. IT HAS BEEN KNOWN SINCE THE BALFOUR DECLARATION AND UP TO THE PRESENT DAY.

BRITAIN AND WORLD IMPERIALISM HAVE IGNORED THE BARBAROUS CRIMES AND BLOODY SLAUGHTERS CARRIED OUT IN OUR OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORY, AND THEIR DEAD CONSCIENCE HAS NOT YET MOVED, WHEREAS THEIR FEVERISH VOICES WENT UP HIGH IN LAMENTING AND CRYING OVER A HANDFUL OF SPIES, AND BRITAIN KNOWS WELL THE BIG CRIME COMMITTED BY THEM AGAINST OUR PEOPLE.

3. AT THE TIME OF ANNOUNCING OUR RESENTMENT OF THE CRIMINAL ATTITUDE OF BRITAIN, WE DEMAND FROM THE REGIONAL COMMAND OF THE SOCIALIST ARAB BATH PARTY AND OUR REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT TO INCREASE THEIR REVOLUTIONARY MEASURES AND CRUSH DOWN THE SPIES MERCILESSLY AND WITHOUT RESTRAINT AND TO RECONSIDER THE RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN, ENEMY OF THE ARAB PEOPLE.

4. LONG LIVE THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOCIALIST ARAB THE BA'TH PARTY FOR UNITY, FREEDOM AND SOCIALIST

5. LONG LIVE THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL.

6. DEATH TO ARE ALL THE SPIES AND AGENTS AND SHAME TO THE ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLES.

THE ASSEMBLED ARAB MASSES.

ENDS.

MR. EVANS

FCO/WHI. DISTRIBUTION .

N. EASTERN D.



EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 105 29 JANUARY, 1969

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM HAWLEY.


THE SITUATION IS NOW QUIETER, THOUGH IT HAS NOT YET BEEN POSSIBLE FOR THE AMBASSADOR TO GET THROUGH OR FOR STAFF TO LEAVE. WE HOPE HOWEVER THAT MOVEMENT WILL SHORTLY BECOME POSSIBLE.

2. WE ARE UNABLE YET TO ASSESS WHETHER FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS ARE LIKELY.

MR. EVANS

FCO DISTRIBUTION  
N. EAST. DEPT.  
DIS MOD

ADVANCE COPIES SENT





(26)

TOP COPY

En Clair

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno 106

29 January, 1969

UNCLASSIFIED

NE

Non-essential Embassy staff have now left and are safely home.

|                                                              |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| RECEIVED IN<br>ARCHIVES No. 15<br>29 JAN 1969<br>NEQ 3/548/1 |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|

La  
mm  
30/1

Mr. Evans.

FCO DISTRIBUTION  
N. East. Dept.  
DIS MOD

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

88888



FOLIO (27)

AND

FOLIO (28)

TRANSFERRED

TO NEQ 2/3



Registry No.

DEPARTMENT **NED**

• Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s).....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

~~Top Secret~~  
~~Secret~~  
~~Confidential~~  
~~Restricted~~  
Unclassified

~~Flash~~  
~~Immediate~~  
~~Priority~~  
Routine

(Date).....

Despatched **29.1.69.**

**CYPHER**

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

En Clair:  
Code  
Cypher

[Security classification  
—if any]

RESTRICTED

[Privacy marking  
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]


Addressed to **BAGHDAD**

telegram No. .... (date) .....

And to .....

repeated for information to .....

Saving to .....



Draft Telegram to:—  
**BAGHDAD**

No. **46.**

(Date) **29.1.69.**

And to:— **29/1**

Repeat to:—

Saving to:—

Your telegram No. 103, paragraph 2.

We have informed COMET accordingly.

Sutcliffe (BP) is postponing his visit.

Dalley (IPC), who was due in Baghdad today, will probably travel tomorrow.

**29.1**

Distribution:—

**Departmental**  
**NED**

**Commodore**

Copies to:— **3 Vils and**

EXAMINED AT  
SIGNATURE **12/10/69**

**12/10/69/12**

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



TOP COPY

(29)

NEQ 3/548/1

RESTRICTED

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 76

TO BAGHDAD

29 JANUARY 1969 (NED)

RESTRICTED.

(23)

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 103 PARAGRAPH 2.

WE HAVE INFORMED COMET ACCORDINGLY.

SUTCLIFFE (BP) IS POSTPONING HIS VISIT. DALLEY (IPC) WHO WAS DUE IN BAGHDAD TODAY, WILL PROBABLY TRAVEL TOMORROW.

STEWART

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

N.EASTERN D.  
C.& O.D.

RESTRICTED



Near Eastern DepartmentIraqi Embassy in London

The Iraqi Ambassador telephoned at 10.30 a.m. to say that he had conveyed Mr. Stewart's message about responsibility for the protection of foreigners in Iraq to his Foreign Minister. His Foreign Minister wished him to protest about a further demonstration planned for 1.00 p.m. today. He wanted this demonstration to be prevented. The Foreign Minister would be summoning H.M. Ambassador to put the same request to him. At this point I told the Ambassador that I could only repeat what I had said yesterday about demonstrations in this country. The Government had no power to prevent these. It was a different matter if those taking part broke the law.

2. Mr. Khalaf then said he wished to protest about the incidents at the Iraqi Embassy yesterday evening. He wished in particular to protest about the violation of the Embassy premises by certain people who hoisted an Israeli flag. A window had also been broken. I said that we regretted these incidents. Mr. Khalaf went on to protest about the inadequacy of the protection given by the police. I asked him if he could specify at what particular time he thought the protection had been inadequate, since I knew that large numbers of police had been engaged. He revised what he had to say on this point to a protest at the failure of the police to prevent demonstrators getting on to the roof of the Embassy; (at one point in the conversation I referred to the press reports that one of the demonstrators who had got on to the roof of the Embassy seemed to have suffered a knife wound at some stage. The Ambassador said that he assumed that the demonstrators must have stabbed each other!).

3. Finally, the Ambassador repeated his request that the demonstration should be prevented. He added that in any case he thought that the demonstrators should be kept at a greater distance from the Embassy premises.

4. I told the Home Secretary's Private Office and Commander Ferguson-Smith of the Special Branch about  
/this



CONFIDENTIAL

this conversation. I said that we strongly supported the Ambassador's request that the demonstrators should be kept at a reasonable distance from the Iraqi Embassy. I pointed out that British subjects in Iraq generally and the staff of H.M. Embassy in Baghdad in particular were in the nature of hostages. A demonstration was in progress in Baghdad. So far it had been peaceful. But the situation in Iraq was so volatile that no one could be certain how long the crowds would remain under control.

5. Later Commander Ferguson-Smith telephoned to say that according to his information the number of demonstrators who would turn up at 1.00 p.m. at the Iraqi Embassy would number about 80. The uniformed police had an adequate force on hand to cope with this. He agreed that I could convey this reassuring news to Mr. Khalaf. I immediately did so. Mr. Khalaf rang back soon after to say that his Military Attache had just reported that a crowd of some 600 had been assembled in Hyde Park and were preparing to march on his Embassy. I passed this item on to the Special Branch.

6. At 2.00 p.m. Commander Ferguson-Smith telephoned to say that at about 1.00 p.m. some 20 young people had turned up outside the Iraqi Embassy. By 2.00 p.m. there were about 50 seated quietly on the pavement opposite the Iraqi Embassy. The police had sent patrols into Hyde Park on receiving my message and had found no sign of any gathering, let alone a crowd of 600 people.

*D. J. D. Maitland*

(D. J. D. Maitland)  
29 January, 1969

Copy to:

Secretary of State  
Sir D. Greenhill  
Mr. Hayman  
Mr. Arthur  
Protocol Department

*Mr Evans*  
*Mr Tupp*  
*Mr Arthur*  
*R.E. 31/1*  
*3/2*  
*Pa*  
*MM*  
*5/2*

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

31

Seen 30 Jan 1969  
R.E.  
29/1

IRAQI EXECUTIONS


The new American Secretary of State, the Quai d'Orsay and U Thant have all now spoken out against the Iraqi executions, the Quai having apparently said that they had intervened with Iraq on a humanitarian basis. Mr. Eshkol speaking in the Knesset is reported to have said that Israel had appealed to international personalities to take action. The Jewish organisations in this country will certainly also expect us to speak out.

2. We are bound to be asked about H.M.G.'s attitude at our press conference today. So far we have simply pointed out that since no British citizens were involved we had no formal basis for intervening. I suggest we might today speak on the record as follows:-

"Since all those involved in the trial appear to be Iraqi citizens, there was no ground for formal intervention by H.M.G. We did however take the question up informally with the Iraqi Government, about two weeks ago, urging clemency and pointing out the effect this trial might have on Iraq's reputation abroad. [We deeply regret that the Iraqi Government did not heed our advice or that of other members of the international community.]"

on humanitarian grounds

As ~~did~~ we understand others did,



John V. Collings

(Miss J.J.d'A. Collings)  
News Department,  
28 January, 1969.

Mr. Tripp

We agreed that I should prepare a submission on this subject.

2. Now, however, I have received this minute from Miss Collings, suggesting a line which the News Department spokesman might take (on the record) at today's news conference at 12.30 p.m. I have also heard from Mr. Brightley (Assistant Private Secretary) that the Secretary of State will not be able to receive a deputation from the Board of Deputies of British Jews either today or tomorrow. The alternatives are that the Secretary of State should receive a deputation on Thursday or that a Minister of State should do so either today or tomorrow. The Private

/Secretary ...



18  
Secretary

is awaiting a recommendation from the Department on which of these alternatives is to be preferred.

3. In these circumstances, I am sending this minute forward instead of a submission and will follow it up with a submission on the question of which Minister should receive a deputation and when.

[Reag B]  
[Reag C]  
4. We now have a good deal of background on the executions which took place yesterday in Baghdad and Basra. The essential facts are given in Baghdad telegram no. 94. We have not yet received telegrams from Washington, New York or Paris about the statements made in those centres by Mr. Rogers, the Secretary General and the official spokesman of the Quai d'Orsay. ~~A~~ Paraphrases of the statements made by Mr. Rogers and the Secretary General appear in today's edition of the Times (in a report from their correspondent in Tel Aviv). According to the Times, Mr. Rogers "expressed the deep concern of the United States over the hangings. He pointed out that since the United States had had no diplomatic representation in Iraq since June 1967, it was 'not in a position to comment on the facts surrounding the trials'." Again according to the Times, the Secretary General "had expressed fears that the executions would upset United Nations efforts to establish peace in the Middle East. Iraq had protested sharply to U Thant over his attitude." According to the London representative of Agence France Presse, the official spokesman of the Quai d'Orsay said that "given the fact that the Iraqi nationality of those executed ruled out any formal approach, the French Ambassador in Baghdad, acting on the same basis as on earlier occasions, had made contact with the Iraqi Government, with a view to diverting the decision of the Iraqi Government towards clemency."

5. Given the barbarity of the executions and our belief that the victims were tried, sentenced and executed for political reasons, we must say something in public. On the other hand any public statement will have to be cautiously worded. The victims were Iraqi citizens and we have no evidence which we might quote to show that the trials were organised for political purposes. I therefore recommend that the News Department spokesman should be authorised to make a statement on the lines of that suggested by Miss Collings in paragraph 2 of her minute. I recommend, however, that the final sentence should be amended to read as follows :

"We very much regret that the Iraqi Government ~~did not heed our plea for clemency.~~"

did not feel able to show

R.M. Evans

(R. M. Evans)  
Near Eastern Dept.  
28 January, 1969

I agree to the proposed line, amended  
as suggested by R. Evans.

R. M. Evans

J. L. [unclear]

28.1.




Mr. EvansMr. Arthur

has been informed

R.E. 29/1

I cleared the proposed statement on the Iraqi executions with Mr. Hayman, who made one alteration to the draft. I then took it to the Private Office and Mr. Maitland took the amended version across to the Secretary of State. He hoped to get the Secretary of State's agreement straight away to a statement in these terms 'on the record'. I had made the point to him that Mr. Hayman preferred that the statement should be made 'off the record', but Mr. Maitland thought that in all the circumstances the Secretary of State would wish it to be made 'on the record'.



(J.P. Tripp)  
28 January, 1969.

Statement made at 12.30 (28 January) at News Departments press conference.

"Since all those involved in the trial appeared to be Iraqi citizens there was no ground for a formal intervention by H.M.G. We did, however, take the question up informally on humanitarian grounds with the Iraq Government - as we understand others did - urging clemency and pointing out the effect on Iraq's reputation abroad.

"We very much regret that the Iraq Government did not (repeat not) feel able to show clemency."

Seen 30/1/68. J. H. Kingston.

New p.m.



telex to paris and north american special.

foreign and commonwealth office news conference, tuesday january 28, 1969.

asked about the hangings in iraq, foreign and commonwealth office spokesman said today: "Since all those involved in the trial appeared to be Iraqi citizens there was no ground for a formal intervention by h.m.g. We did, however, take the question up informally on humanitarian grounds with the Iraq Government - as we understand others did - urging clemency and pointing out the effect on Iraq's reputation abroad.

"We very much regret that the Iraq Government did not (rpt not) feel able to show clemency."

correspondent asked if h.m.g. were making further informal demarches about other people in Iraq "threatened with hanging".

spokesman: "I cannot say. I have no information on the subject."

correspondent asked if the british government had had any request on the matter from the israeli government.

spokesman: "We had in fact representations from a ~~xxxx~~ number of quarters."

a correspondent asked if the foreign and commonwealth secretary, mr michael stewart, would be receiving a deputation from the british board of deputies.

spokesman replied that there had been a request for such a meeting. he could not (rpt not) say what arrangements might be arrived at.

a correspondent referred to an interview given ~~the~~ by the Israeli foreign minister, mr eban, to a german magazine in the course of which mr eban had reportedly said that britain had told him that they considered the soviet proposals on the <sup>middle</sup> ~~west~~ east unacceptable.

spokesman reminded the correspondent that when the soviet charge had called on mr stewart last week he (the spokesman) had said unattribtably that in our view the soviet proposals did have some constructive elements. there were some questions raised by the proposals, which we had put to the soviet government.

pressed that mr eban had reportedly said that britain had told the israeli government that the soviet proposals were totally unacceptable, spokesman replied: "I have only seen the press reports so I would rather leave my ~~u-~~



2 Spokesman

unattributable comment (of last week) as it ~~stands~~ stands."

end of spokesman on iraq hangings and middle east. more spokesman to follow.



(32)

NEQ 3/548/1

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 80

TO BAGHDAD

29 JANUARY 1969 (NED)

CONFIDENTIAL.

(32)

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 75.

HEAD OF PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT APOLOGISED ON THE TELEPHONE THIS AFTERNOON FOR THE WINDOW BROKEN IN THE IRAQI EMBASSY. THE AMBASSADOR WAS FRIENDLY AND PROFESSED HIMSELF SATISFIED WITH THE POLICE MEASURES TAKEN FOR THE SAFETY OF THE EMBASSY.

STEWART

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

N.EAST.D.

PROT.& CONF.D.

CONFIDENTIAL



Registry No. **NE1**  
DEPARTMENT

• Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s) \_\_\_\_\_

| SECURITY CLASSIFICATION                                                   | PRIORITY MARKINGS                                |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Top Secret<br>Secret<br><u>Confidential</u><br>Restricted<br>Unclassified | Flash<br>Immediate<br><u>Priority</u><br>Routine |

(Date) \_\_\_\_\_

Despatched \_\_\_\_\_

29.1.69

29/1  
1703

**CYPHER**

PRIVACY MARKING

*In Confidence*

*En Clair.  
Code  
Cypher*

[Security classification  
—if any]

CONFIDENTIAL

[Privacy marking  
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]


Addressed to **BAGHDAD**

telegram No. \_\_\_\_\_ (date) **29.1.69**

And to \_\_\_\_\_

repeated for information to \_\_\_\_\_

Saving to \_\_\_\_\_



Draft Telegram to:—  
**BAGHDAD**

No. **80**

(Date) **29.1.69**

And to: **29/1**

Repeat to:—

Saving to:—

My telegram No. 75.

Head of Protocol Department apologised on the telephone this afternoon for the window broken in the Iraqi Embassy. The Ambassador was friendly and professed himself satisfied with the police measures taken for the safety of the Embassy.

Distribution:—  
Departmental  
N.E.D.  
Protocol and  
Conference Dept.

Copies to:—

*Deft. L.*

*29.1.*

*18562  
29/1/69*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN





CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NO. 75

29 JANUARY 1969 (NEQ)

NEQ 3/548/1

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD TELNO. 75 OF 29 JANUARY, REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO AMMAN, TEHRAN.

IRAQ/U.K. RELATIONS.

YOUR TELNO. 102. (20)

DEMONSTRATIONS TOOK PLACE LAST NIGHT OUTSIDE IRAQI EMBASSY BY  
CROWD VARIOUSLY ESTIMATED AS TWO TO FOUR THOUSAND IN CONJUNCTION  
WITH A JEWISH QUOTE SILENT VIGIL UNQUOTE. A MEMBER OF THE CROWD  
THOUGHT TO BE A JEW WAS APPARENTLY STABBED WHEN HOISTING ISRAELI  
FLAG OVER BUILDING. ATTEMPTS TO STORM EMBASSY PREVENTED BY  
POLICE. WINDOW IN EMBASSY REPORTEDLY BROKEN DURING DEMONSTRATION.

2. FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS EXPECTED OUTSIDE IRAQI EMBASSY THIS  
AFTERNOON. POLICE HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MOVE CROWDS ON AND TO  
KEEP THEM AT SAFE DISTANCE FROM THE BUILDING. THIS FOLLOWS  
REPRESENTATIONS FROM THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR WHO HAS ASKED FOR  
FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS TO BE PREVENTED.

STEWART.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

N.EAST.D.  
ARABIAN D.  
NEWS D.  
N.AFR.D.  
U.N.D.  
P.U.S.D.

CONFIDENTIAL



Registry No. **E**  
DEPARTMENT N **EQ**

\* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should  
reach addressee(s).....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

~~Top Secret~~  
~~Secret~~  
~~Confidential~~  
~~Restricted~~  
~~Unclassified~~

~~Flash~~  
~~Immediate~~  
~~Priority~~  
~~Routine~~

(Date).....

Despatched

29/1/69  
1315  
**CYPHER**

PRIVACY MARKING

*In Confidence*

[Security classification  
—if any]

CONFIDENTIAL

*En Clair.*  
*Code*  
*Cypher*

[Privacy marking  
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Draft Telegram to:—

Baghdad

No. 45

(Date) 29/1

And to:—

Addressed to BAGHDAD

telegram No. 75 (date) 29 January, 1969.

And to

repeated for information to AMMAN, TEHRAN (routine)

Saving to

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 15

30 JAN 1969

NEQ 3/548/1

Repeat to:—

Amman,

Tehran (routine)

Saving to:—

Distribution:—

Departmental

N.E.D.

Copies to:—

Iraq/U.K. relations.

Your telegram No. 102 [of 29 January]

Demonstrations took place last night outside Iraqi Embassy by crowd variously estimated as two to four thousand in conjunction with a Jewish "Silent Vigil". A member of the crowd thought to be a Jew was apparently stabbed when hoisting Israeli flag over building. Attempts to storm Embassy prevented by police. Window in Embassy reportedly broken during demonstration.

2. Further demonstrations expected outside Iraqi Embassy this afternoon. Police have been instructed to move crowds on and to keep them at safe distance from the Building. This follows representations from the Iraqi Ambassador who has asked for further demonstrations to be prevented.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

*Sept 11*

*PMH*

29/1

29/1  
1150/29/12



Mr. Makinson

The Iraqi Ambassador's secretary phoned to say that BBC television crews were outside the Embassy and the Ambassador was rather worried in case the BBC had heard that a demonstration was about to be staged.

Margaret.

1.45/28 January



I spoke to the officer concerned in the  
Mi Clift, (Home Office)

Horseferry Ho X 115.  
who undertook to alert Special Branch.

Shelton  
NEQ refer.

New reg 2 p.a. *[initials]*



(32)

NEQ 3/548/1

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER 80

29 JANUARY 1969 (NED)

CONFIDENTIAL.

(32)

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 75.

HEAD OF PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT APOLOGISED ON THE TELEPHONE THIS AFTERNOON FOR THE WINDOW BROKEN IN THE IRAQI EMBASSY. THE AMBASSADOR WAS FRIENDLY AND PROFESSED HIMSELF SATISFIED WITH THE POLICE MEASURES TAKEN FOR THE SAFETY OF THE EMBASSY.

STEWART

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

N.EAST.D.

PROT.& CONF.D.

CONFIDENTIAL



(34)

RESTRICTED

TOP COPY

NEQ 3/548/i

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER 84

29 JANUARY 1969 (NED)

RESTRICTED.

IRAQ/UK RELATIONS.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 75 PARA 2.

A SMALL DEMONSTRATION OF ABOUT 80 (REPORTED TO US BY IRAQI AMBASSADOR AS 600) TOOK PLACE PEACEABLY AT 13.30 TODAY (29 JANUARY).

2. A FURTHER SMALL DEMONSTRATION TOOK PLACE AT 17.00. NO REPEAT NO INCIDENTS.

STEWART

FCO DISTRIBUTION

N. EASTERN D.

RESTRICTED



Registry No.  
DEPARTMENT

~~SECRET~~ NEP

\* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should  
reach addressee(s)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

Top Secret  
Secret  
Confidential  
Restricted  
Unclassified

Flash  
Immediate  
Priority  
Routine

(Date)

Despatched

29/1  
1935

SECRET

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

En Clair.  
Code  
Cypher

[Security classification  
—if any]

[Privacy marking  
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Restricted

Addressed to


Baghdad

telegram No. (date)

And to

repeated for information to

Saving to



Draft Telegram to:

No. 84

(Date) 29/1

And to:—

Repeat to:—

Saving to:—

Distribution:—

Copies to:—

Iraq / UK relations  
my tel 75 para 2 [of 29 JAN]  
A small demonstration of about  
80 ~~assembly~~ (reported to  
us by Iraqi Ambassador as  
600) took place peacefully  
at 13.30 today (29 JAN)  
2. A further small demonstration  
took place at 1700. No  
rpt No incidents.

Jhm  
29/1

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

18452  
29/8





**B32 IRAQI PROTEST AGAINST BRITAIN'S ATTITUDE TO EXECUTIONS**

NE (BAGHDAD RADIO) THE IRAQI REPUBLIC PROTESTED STRONGLY TO BRITAIN LAST NIGHT OVER HER ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EXECUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SPY RING. THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN LONDON HANDED THE PROTEST TO THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE.

THE IRAQI EMBASSY STATED THAT IT WAS REGRETTABLE THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD REGARD THIS SUBJECT AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR INTERFERING IN THE AFFAIRS OF AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE.

END BBC MON 1300 29/1 KB UP1 TVN

leg N.E.Q.  
to P.A.

PKMH  
29/1



FOLIO 36

TRANSFERRED

TO NEQ ~~18~~/2



*Byshy*  
**(37)**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

|                                                              |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| RECEIVED IN<br>ARCHIVES No. 15<br>31 JAN 1969<br>NEP 3/548/1 |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|

**RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SIR DENIS GREENHILL  
AND THE AMBASSADOR OF IRAQ HELD AT THE FOREIGN AND  
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE ON THURSDAY, 30 JANUARY, 1969,  
AT 12.45 P.M.**

**PRESENT**

**Sir Denis Greenhill  
Mr. J.P. Tripp**

**His Excellency  
Mr. K.M. Khalaf**

The Iraqi Ambassador called at his own request on Sir Denis Greenhill on 30 January. Mr. Khalaf said he had come on the telephoned instructions of his Foreign Minister in Baghdad, which he had just received, to inform the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of an alleged Israeli aerial bombardment of Iraqi military positions earlier today. According to the Ambassador's information, two Israeli aircraft out of seven which had attacked Iraqi positions, had been shot down and Israeli aircraft were "still coming in". The Ambassador was not sure whether the attack had taken place on Iraqi positions in Jordan or over the border in Iraq. He had been instructed to advise the United Kingdom Government, as a permanent member of the Security Council, of this attack which the Iraqis maintained had been planned for some time and which they had put into operation, using the Baghdad executions as a pretext.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**/2....**



**DISTRIBUTION**

**PRIVATE SECRETARY**

**MR. HAYMAN**

**MR. ARTHUR**

**NEAR  STERN DEPT. (4)**

**NEWS DEPT.**

**ANNAN**

**BAGHDAD**

**TEL AVIV**



**CONFIDENTIAL**

2. Sir Denis Greenhill said that when the Permanent Under Secretary had spoken to the Israeli Ambassador following the Baghdad hangings, he had expressed the hope that these would not be used as a reason for mounting retaliatory raids. He had expressed the desirability of keeping the temperature down. If Mr. Khalaf's report were true, we would very much regret that our advice to Israel had been ignored. These events inevitably led on to each other and we regretted the mounting tempo of these incidents.

3. Mr. Khalaf said he would also like to ask about a possible four power meeting on the Middle East as proposed by the French. Sir D. Greenhill said that the Ambassador would be aware that we had sent a reply to the recent Soviet note and had also replied to the French proposal for a four power meeting. The Secretary of State would be seeing the Secretary General of the United Nations this week when he visited London, and the Ambassador would know that H.M.G. were very keen to see a satisfactory settlement worked out.

4. Mr. Khalaf said he would like, in the context of Mr. Roberts' kind offer to help whenever he could if it seemed that the British publicity media were distorting the Arab standpoint, to raise the matter of the ITV (Thames) television interview with himself yesterday. He described what had happened and said that the interview with him at his Embassy which eventually appeared on Thames television, had completely ignored many of the constructive points which he had sought to make on the Middle East problem and had concentrated on the Baghdad hangings. This was very unfair and he wondered

**CONFIDENTIAL**

/another....



**CONFIDENTIAL**

whether we could do anything about it. Sir D. Greenhill said he quite appreciated the Ambassador's feelings and advised him to write to Mr. Snow, making his objections to the way in which the interview had been handled. He doubted whether the Foreign and Commonwealth Office could intervene, but if they found an opportunity to say something in the appropriate quarter, they would do so.

5. Finally, Mr. Khalaf asked whether H.M.O. proposed to make a statement about the Baghdad hangings, to which Sir D. Greenhill replied that they did not, but that the Ambassador should know that Mr. Shinwell had put down a Parliamentary Question for today and that there would undoubtedly be a short exchange in the House of Commons.

**CONFIDENTIAL**



From: Patrick Wolrige-Gordon M.P.

38

HOUSE OF COMMONS

LONDON, SW1

Acknowledgement

Secretary of State

to see  
has not seen

Jan. 28th. 1969.

New Eastern

draft reply from

Lord Shepherd

please.

29/1

Dear Stuart,

I am, like many others, deeply concerned by recent developments in Iraq; but may I raise in particular the question of Mr. Bazzaz, and what we are doing on his behalf.

I got to know him quite well recently and found him a moderate minded man of considerable integrity and vision. I cannot believe he would have engaged himself in underhand or treasonable activities. Moreover as he was Ambassador here for a bit. I imagine we are in a position to show the deepest solicitude for his safety, and I would be very grateful to know what is happening.

Yours sincerely,

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.15  
21 JAN 1969  
NEQ 3/548/1

Patrick Wolrige-Gordon

Rt. Hon. Michael Stewart M.P.  
Foreign Secretary.  
Downing St.  
S.W.I.

|                   |     |
|-------------------|-----|
| MINISTER OF STATE |     |
| Recd. 31/1        | Ack |
| To                |     |



RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.15

31 JAN 1969



NEQ 3/548/1

*With the compliments of*  
**PROTOCOL AND CONFERENCE  
DEPARTMENT**

*(R. CANNING)*

*For*

*L. Hinchcliffe* <sup>ANN</sup> 29/1.

**FOREIGN OFFICE/COMMONWEALTH OFFICE**

S.W.1

*L. Hinchcliffe*

*on Ann*

29.1



Mr. Mayall

Iraqi Embassy

I spoke to Mr. McDonough at the Home Office about the incidents at the Iraqi Embassy yesterday and the continued presence of a number of demonstrators outside the Embassy today. He has spoken to Superintendent Hope (New Scotland Yard) who says

- (a) enquiries are proceeding into the pulling down of the Iraqi flag;
- (b) enquiries are also proceeding into the alleged stabbing of one of the demonstrators who is presently in hospital;
- (c) the situation at the Iraqi Embassy at the moment is very quiet but from 12.30 p.m. 120 police will be deployed around the Embassy to afford protection to the premises.

2. For our own information, it is not clear whether proceedings will be taken against the people involved in the flag incident as this can only be decided when police enquiries are completed. The demonstrator who is in hospital alleged that he was stabbed by an Iraqi Embassy official. Subject to further enquiries which the police are making they may well wish to take action against the person concerned.

3. We will be kept informed of any developments.

(R. Canning)  
29 January, 1969



39

REC IN  
ARCH No. 15  
30  
NEQ 3/5/78

CONFIDENTIAL

Minutes.

H. of C.  
First Secretary *Em. No. 1.*  
D.A. *161*  
Mr. Hamilton *8:21*  
H.E. o.r.  
IG Sec (AET) o.c.

Meeting with Mr. Omar Adeel

I went and called on Mr. Omar Adeel, the Representative of UNDP on 15 January. He made the following points:

(a) Political

The present situation was very perplexing. It was very difficult to say where power lay, but it seemed that it had slipped from President Bakr's hands. This was a pity as he was an extremely nice man. Sheikhly was important, particularly since he was the unofficial Secretary General of the Ba'ath Party. Ammash appeared to be gaining ground and was exceedingly ambitious. Tikriti, some people thought, was due to be dumped recently when he was paying his visit to Cairo.

He was very worried about harrassment of U.N. personnel. There had been three cases, Snell's wife (see separate minute), Stainburn being caught up in the International School incident, and two days ago an Indian employed by U.N. had been beaten up by two security men when he was on his way to post a letter at the Baghdad Hotel at about 4.p.m. He, Omar Adeel, had protested in writing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about all these incidents. The U.N. people in New York were very concerned about the recent turn in events. The U.N. personnel had been

.../warned

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.



CONFIDENTIAL

*Minutes.*

warned not to make unnecessary trips outside Baghdad and not to go out unnecessarily at night particularly if unaccompanied (This applied particularly to women and children). The U.N. had a warden system for keeping in touch with their personnel and there was always someone on duty at the headquarters for 24 hours.

(b) The Jespersen Incident

He said that he had understood from the Kuwaiti Ambassador that the real reason why Mr. Jespersen had been expelled at such short notice was that he had used extremely strong language when he called on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to protest at the International School incident, using such terms as "fascist regime". In addition the Iraqi Government had evidence that he had constantly made unfriendly statements about the Arabs in general and Iraq in particular during his time here. Exception was ~~already~~ taken to the fact that he had been released at a fairly early stage in the investigations at the International School but had insisted on remaining until the children were allowed to leave.

When he heard that something was happening at the International School, he, Omar Adeel, telephoned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs saying that he understood that some security investigation was taking place there. However the

.../M.F.A.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.



NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

CONFIDENTIAL

*Minutes.*

M.F.A., having checked with security, maintained that security knew nothing about it. It subsequently transpired that the investigation was being made by the military intelligence. It appeared that real concern had been caused to the Iraqis because the night watchman had been killed in a place so close to the Presidential Palace. It was still obscure how he had met his death though it was possible that it was due to a stray bullet since there had been firing in the area on the previous night.

(c) Iraq's financial position

He thought that Iraq was in a very bad way financially. They had good revenue from oil but how much was being diverted for military purposes was anybody's guess. Certainly one could not rely on published figures at all. He understood that the Iraqis were cutting back on a number of important projects in the current year.

(d) Agriculture

The President remained very keen on improving the agricultural sector. In fact considerable strides had been made recently over this and last year was the first year that there was an exportable excess of rice and wheat since

.../1960



CONFIDENTIAL

*Minutes.*

1960. There was a strong possibility that his year's harvest would be even better and according to U.N. agricultural experts, whose estimates were correct last year, there could be a crop of 1½ million tons of wheat.

(e) Petroleum Research

Petroleum research was a Special Fund project for which about \$1 million had been earmarked. UNESCO was the managing agency and it was a very sensitive project to which the Iraqis attached considerable importance. Its object was inter alia to conduct research into Iraq's reserve of oil. Mr. Snell was a reservoir engineer and he was exceptionally well qualified, having served previously in IPC and latterly on a similar project in India. He would, however, be leaving later this year, since UNESCO had decided to sub-contract the agency work to the French Petroleum Institute, a decision taken before the present government came in for political reasons, after Abdel Rahman Aref's visit to Paris. He, Omar Adeel, was not too happy about this.

Mr. Snell's view was that the incident concerning his wife was caused by the U.N. driver who had recently been dismissed. However, Mr. Shaikhly thought that it must have been someone deliberately trying to embarrass the regime since they had noted that Mr. Snell had been summoned to the police to receive .../the

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.



NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

CONFIDENTIAL

Minutes.

the present of two carpets from President Bakr for his original research on cement. Mr. Shaikhly had said that he did not know who was causing incidents of this sort, but that it appeared that there were enemies of the present government doing their best to discredit them.

Th.

(D. F. Hawley)  
15 January, 1969

If Mr. Bail has been beaten up and a show trial of American "spies" is staged, there will be no need for the régime's enemies to give any assistance in bringing discredit on the Ba'ath.


1/11/69  
14,

copy to  
NE Dept?  
CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

40



Mr. Arthur

Soviet memorandum on Middle East

Problem

Should we inform the Iraqi Ambassador of the reasons for our denial of the existence of a Soviet memorandum? He has complained of our duplicity to H.M. Ambassador, Baghdad.

Recommendation

I recommend

(a) that we should not take specific steps to do so, but that you or Mr. Roberts might do so if the opportunity offers;

(b) that instructions similar to those sent to Kuwait should be sent to Baghdad. I attach a draft.

/ Flag A

Argument

1. We are under no obligation to disclose every diplomatic move to the Iraqis. To make too much of this might suggest that we were.

2. The Arabs are chronically suspicious. It is unlikely that Mr. Khallaf believes unreservedly anything he is told in the Foreign Office. On the other hand he may feel disposed to give more weight to what we say if we can justify our previous hyperbole. Although arrant liars

CONFIDENTIAL



themselves, the Arabs curiously expect different standards from us, and feel aggrieved if they think we fall short.

Background

1. When Mr. Khallaf called on Mr. Roberts on 7 January, Mr. Roberts in deference to Soviet requests was careful to say that there had been no written communication. There had in fact been a piece of paper pour memoire recapitulating the Soviet Ambassador's oral communication. *Flag B*
2. The fact that this piece of paper existed was leaked to the Beirut press on 10 January, and to the Paris press on 16 January. *Flag C*
3. When H.M. Ambassador, Baghdad, was in London recently the Iraqi Ambassador complained that everyone knew there had been a written communication. Why had he not been told the truth? H.M. Ambassador has suggested there would be advantage in giving our version of events.
4. We have already done so in the case of Kuwait.

*St. Makinson*

N.E.D.

20 Jan '69

*Mr. Makinson.*

I do not think the tel. to Kuwait is a suitable model: too much has happened since then. A. speak.

*~~Mr. Evans (NED)~~*

CONFIDENTIAL

*ser 2*  
I have talked this  
/problem



problem over with Mr Arthur.

2. We have repeated all important telegrams about recent developments to Baghdad, either telegraphically or by airmail. Moreover, Mr Evans will by now have received Guidance No. 18, which gives a fairly full account of these developments.

This should be enough for him (even though we do not propose to give the Iraqi Ambassador an account of what we have said in reply to the Soviet communications).

R.E.

24/11.

Spoken letter referring to Guidance No 18 drafted.

New p.a. Jm  
28/11



SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret  
Secret  
Confidential  
Restricted  
Unclassified

20  
1

PRIORITY MARKINGS

Flash  
Immediate }  
Priority  
Routine

(Date).....

Despatched .....

PRIVACY MARKING

*In Confidence*

*En Clair.*  
~~Code~~  
Cypher

[Security classification  
—if any]

CONFIDENTIAL

[Privacy marking  
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

BAGHDAD

Addressed to .....

telegram No. .... (date) .....

And to .....

repeated for information to .....

*Inspected*

Saving to .....

Soviet approach on the Middle East.

The facts are as described in my telegrams number 5 and number 6 to Moscow. We used the formula in guidance telegram number 1 because the Soviet Ambassador made a point of asking us not to disclose that any document had been communicated to me. But this has now leaked.

2. In speaking to Ministers, you may say that the Soviet Ambassador gave me two communications on 2 January. Both communications dealt with the Middle East. The second contained a set of proposals for making progress towards the achievement of a settlement (these proposals have now been leaked to the press in Beirut). You may also make the following points:

(a) The proposals have also been communicated to the French and American Governments.

(b) The proposals represent an advance on earlier Soviet views, particularly in respect of the

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Draft Telegram to:—  
BAGHDAD

No. ....

(Date) .....

And to:—

Repeat to:—

Saving to:—

Distribution:—

Copies to:—



role to be played by Jarring and of the need to treat the settlement as a complete package.

c) We are giving careful study to the proposals and expect to reply to them soon.

**NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN**





*With the compliments of*  
**THE COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR**

*Reg & pa*

*DM 29/1*

**BRITISH EMBASSY  
BAGHDAD**



(WEM.5/248/1)

29 January, 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

Soviet and French Proposals on the Middle East

When you were in London you raised the question of our replies to earlier enquiries by the Iraqi Ambassador in London about the Soviet oral communication, and Mr. Khallaf's feeling that he had been misled by Mr. Geronny Roberts' statement to him about the Soviet communication.

2. It would not be appropriate, at present, to summon Mr. Khallaf simply to put the record straight, and in the present atmosphere, following the executions, we are not likely to have the opportunity of referring to the matter en passant. Nevertheless you have authority, in the terms of Guidance telegram No.18 of 23 January, to clear up the matter with the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs if and when you think it appropriate.

(J.P. Tripp)

His Excellency  
Mr. Trevor Evans, C.M.G., C.B.E.,  
British Embassy,  
Baghdad.

CONFIDENTIAL



Registry  
No.

3/548/1  
NEQ.

DRAFT

Letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
~~Secret~~  
Confidential.  
~~Restricted~~  
Unclassified.

28/1

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

To:—

M<sup>r</sup> Trevor Evans  
Baghdad.

From

M<sup>r</sup> Tripp

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

NEQ

[M<sup>r</sup> Tripp]

Soviet and French  
proposals on the Middle East

When you were in London you raised the question of our replies to earlier enquiries by the Iraqi Ambassador in London about the Soviet <sup>oral</sup> communication, <sup>Mr Khallaf's</sup> ~~that~~ feeling that he had been <sup>misled</sup> deceived by M<sup>r</sup> Corning Roberts' statement. I think about the Soviet communication. It would not be appropriate, at present, to summon ~~the Iraqi Ambassador~~ M<sup>r</sup> Khallaf simply to put the record straight, ~~as we are not likely to see much of him~~ and in the present atmosphere, following the executions, we are not likely to have the

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



opportunity of ~~canal~~  
referring to the matter  
en passant. Nevertheless

you have authority,  
in the terms of Guidance

telegram

No 18 of 23 January, to  
clear up the matter

with the Iraqi M.F.A.  
if and when  
~~should~~ you think it

appropriate.

f  
29.1.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



(42)

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

CYPHER/CAT A  
PRIORITY BAGHDAD  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 115

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
30 JANUARY 1969

|                                                            |
|------------------------------------------------------------|
| RECEIVED IN<br>ARCHIVES No. 15<br>31 JAN 1969<br>NE 63/548 |
|------------------------------------------------------------|

NE

CONFIDENTIAL

MY TELEGRAM NO. [GROUP UNDEC.]: ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS.

IT IS TOO EARLY TO JUDGE WHAT THE LONGER TERM EFFECTS OF YESTERDAY'S DEMONSTRATIONS HERE AND RECENT EVENTS IN LONDON WILL BE. TODAY'S PRESS IS HOSTILE TO BRITAIN IN A MANNER WHICH IT HAS NOT BEEN SINCE THE RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS AND THE MAJORITY OF IRAQIS PROBABLY REGARD THE OFFICIAL PRESS STATEMENTS IN LONDON ABOUT THE EXECUTIONS AS UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE IN THEIR AFFAIRS.

2. ON THE OTHER HAND THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT WE SHALL STILL BE ABLE TO DO BUSINESS WITH THE IRAQIS IN THE COMMERCIAL AND MILITARY FIELDS. AN ARMY REPRESENTATIVE VISITED THE EMBASSY TODAY IN CONNECTION WITH EARTH MOVING EQUIPMENT FOR THE IRAQI ARMY AND THE DEFENCE ATTACHE HAD BUSINESS-LIKE CONTACTS, WHICH WERE PERSONALLY FRIENDLY, IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE THIS MORNING. HOWEVER SOME RESERVE WAS DISCERNIBLE.

3. THE COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR WAS RECEIVED IN A PERSONALLY FRIENDLY MANNER IN THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY. REGRETS WERE EXPRESSED THAT IT HAD BEEN NECESSARY TO CANCEL THE COMET MISSION AND HOPES THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MOUNT IT WHEN THINGS HAD SETTLED DOWN QUOTE IN ABOUT A MONTH'S TIME UNQUOTE.

MR. EVANS

FCO DISTRIBUTION  
N.EAST. DEPT.

DMA  
416


CONFIDENTIAL



EN CLAIR

PRIORITY BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELNO. 132

UNCLASSIFIED



NE

ADDSD TO FCO TEL NO 132 OF 1 FEB RFI TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, KUWAIT, TEHRAN, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK. LOCAL PRESS REPORT, 1 FEBRUARY. AL NUR (INDEPENDENT) REPORTS THAT WHEN THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN LONDON INFORMED THE PUS OF THE ALLEGED RECENT ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAQI UNITS IN JORDAN HE WAS TOLD THAT HMG HAD RECEIVED NO INFORMATION ABOUT IT. THE BBC IS ACCUSED OF LEADING ZIONIST AND IMPERIALIST BROADCASTS IN A FEVERISH CAMPAIGN AGAINST IRAQ AND IN DELIBERATELY FABRICATING AND DISTORTING NEWS FROM OFFICIAL IRAQI SOURCES. EACH BBC BROADCAST OF 31 JANUARY IS SAID TO HAVE CONTAINED 10 MINUTES OF SUCH ATTACKS AND CONDEMNATION OF THE HANGINGS. AL NUR COMMENTS THAT THE PUPOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN IS TO HIDE RENEWED AGGRESSION BEING PLANNED BY ISRAEL AND IMPERIALISM AGAINST IRAQI UNITS ON THE EASTERN FRONT. A CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR REPORT HAS ALSO BEEN INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT WORLD IMPERIALISM AND ZIONISM ARE CONSPIRING AGAINST THE IRAQI REGIME. FCO PASS SAVING TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MR. EVANS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FCO/WH: DISTRIBUTION  
N.E.D.

\*\*\*\*\*

AM 4/2




EN CLAIR

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TELNO 133

UNCLASSIFIED



FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

3 FEB 1969

TOP COPY

NE

ADDSD TO FCO TEL NO 133 OF 1 FEB RFI AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, KUWAIT, TEHRAN, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK. LOCAL PRESS REPORT, 31 JANUARY. AL JUMHURIYA (GOVT SPONSORED) STATES THAT THE TIMES OF LONDON IS CONCENTRATING ON CURSING THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ AND ON DISTORTING IRAQI NEWS. 2. AL HURRIYA (INDEPENDENT) REHEARSES THE LINE ABOUT THE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN LONDON, ADDING THAT BRITAINS HOSTILE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ARABS AND HER WISH TO RESTORE HER DOMINATION OVER THE ARABS ARE WELL KNOWN. IRAQS ACTION IN HANGING SPIES HAS REVEALED BRITAINS HYPOCRISY IN SPONSORING THE NOVEMBER 1967 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WHILE BEING IN COLLUSION WITH ISRAEL AGAINST THE ARABS. THE PAPER WARNS THE PEOPLE AGAINST BRITAIN AND EXHORTS THEM TO BE MORE VIGILANT AND CAUTIOUS IN THE FUTURE. ISRAELS MILITARY CONCENTRATIONS ARE LINKED WITH THE SECRET DESPATCH OF BRITISH ARMS TO ISRAEL THROUGH CYPRUS, BRITISH REINFORCEMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE PRESENCE OF THE BRITISH COMMANDER IN ISRAEL. THE PAPER REFERS TO THE SUPPORT GIVEN BY BRITAIN TO ISRAEL IN JUNE 1967 AND SAYS THAT TIME WILL REVEAL THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WICKED ROLE BRITAIN PLAYED IN THE JUNE WAR. 3. VACCILLATION AND TWO FACED ATTITUDES ON THE PALESTINE ISSUE BY CERTAIN STATES, THE PAPER CONTINUES, CAN ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS UNFRIENDLY ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ARABS. PERHAPS IRAQ SHOULD REVIEW HER ATTITUDE TOWARDS CERTAIN STATES IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR BEHAVIOUR OVER THE HANGINGS . + WE REFUSE TO STRETCH OUT OUR HANDS TO A STATE WHICH HARBOURS HOSTILITY TOWARDS US AND SUPPORTS OUR ENEMY, ISRAEL, UNDER VARIOUS SLOGANS +. FCO PASS SAVING TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MR. EVANS

RMH

9/2.

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

FCO DISTRIBUTION

NEAR EASTERN DEPT.



CONFIDENTIAL


TOP COPY <sup>45</sup>

CYPHER/CAT A  
PRIORITY BAGHDAD  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 136

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
1 FEBRUARY 1969

NE

CONFIDENTIAL



<sup>Lx2</sup>  
MY TELEGRAM NO 115: ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS.

COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR SAW BABAJAN, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL AT THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY THIS MORNING. HE IS THE COUSIN OF SHAIKHLY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND EVIDENTLY QUITE CLOSE TO HIM. THE FOLLOWING POINTS, FOR WHAT THEY ARE WORTH, EMERGED IN CONVERSATION:-

(A) BABAJAN AND HIS MINISTER WERE VERY DISAPPOINTED THAT THE COMET MISSION HAD HAD TO BE POSTPONED. THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT HAD INTENDED THAT THE COMET MISSION SHOULD BE OFFICIAL GUESTS AND HAD GONE A LONG WAY TO FINALISING THE PROGRAMME WHICH WAS ON THE POINT OF BEING PRINTED. AFTER THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE DEMONSTRATIONS HERE, SHAIKHLY HAD DECIDED THAT THE TIME WAS NOT OPPORTUNE: BABAJAN HOWEVER HOPED THAT THINGS MIGHT SETTLE DOWN AND THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO INVITE THE COMET MISSION AGAIN QUOTE WITHIN A WEEK OR TWO UNQUOTE. HE ASKED HAWLEY TO MAINTAIN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH HIM:

(B) THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN EMBARRASSED BY THE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE EMBASSY, AS THEY HAD DECIDED, AFTER HEARING REPORTS FROM LONDON, THAT NO ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN IN BAGHDAD. HOWEVER THE TRADE UNION LEADERS HAD BEATEN THE GUN AND HAD MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT DEMONSTRATING ON THE RADIO. SHAIKHLY HAD BEEN EXTREMELY ANNOYED BUT THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT FEEL ABLE TO CALL THE DEMONSTRATIONS OFF:

(C) THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT TO DISPLAY THE BODIES OF THE EXECUTED MEN HAD BEEN TAKEN FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL REASONS. THE EXTERNAL REPERCUSSIONS, EVEN INCLUDING ISRAELI RETALIATION, HAD BEEN

/TAKEN

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE THE DECISION WAS TAKEN. THE BA'ATH PARTY WAS SMALL AND HAD MANY ENEMIES INCLUDING NASSERISTS AND COMMUNISTS. ALTHOUGH THEY HAD DONE MANY GOOD THINGS, THEY STILL HAD NOT ATTAINED POPULARITY AND THIS IS WHAT HAD DRIVEN THEM TO MONDAY'S DISPLAY:

(D) THE TONE OF THE PRESS IN BAGHDAD WAS UNDULY SHRILL AND CAUSED SOME EMBARRASSMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT. THE SITUATION WOULD NOT RETURN TO NORMAL UNTIL PRESS COMMENTS ON EITHER SIDE WERE MODERATED.

MR. EVANS

FCO DISTRIBUTION  
N. EASTERN DEPT.

\*\*\*\*\*

CONFIDENTIAL

*MMH*  
*4/2*



FOLIO

46

TRANSFERRED

TO NEQ 18/2.



TOP COPY (47)

EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE TEHRAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 100

3 FEBRUARY 1969

UNCLASSIFIED

NE

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO. 100 OF 3 FEBRUARY,  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BAGHDAD.

GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ON ADVICE TO GIVE IN PRESENT  
CIRCUMSTANCES TO BRITISH BUSINESSMEN WISHING TO VISIT IRAQ.

SIR D. WRIGHT



F I L E S

ADVANCE COPY SENT

NEAR EASTERN DEPT.  
EXPORT PROMOTION DEPT.  
GUIDANCE DEPT.  
MR. ARTHUR

NNNNN



(48)

TOP COPY NEQ 3/548/i

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NO 83

TO TEHRAN  
3 FEBRUARY 1969  
(NED)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO TEHRAN TELNO 83 OF 3 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION  
TO BAGHDAD.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 100: ADVISE TO BRITISH BUSINESSMEN.  
WE DO NOT THINK SITUATION WARRANTS OUR GIVING GENERAL ADVICE TO  
VISITORS TO KEEP AWAY FROM IRAQ. WE ARE, HOWEVER, ADVISING  
ENQUIRERS THAT UNLESS THEY CONSIDER THEIR VISITS ESSENTIAL THEY  
SHOULD CONSIDER DEFERRING THEM FOR A FEW DAYS.  
2. PROSPECTIVE VISITORS TO IRAQ ARE ALSO BEING ADVISED TO NOTIFY  
BAGHDAD ON ARRIVAL OF THEIR ADDRESS IN IRAQ AND LENGTH OF STAY.

STEWART  
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
N.E.D.  
CONSULAR D.  
NEWS D.  
EMERGENCY UNIT

CONFIDENTIAL

la/mm  
sh



Registry No.  
DEPARTMENT NED

\* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should  
reach addressee(s)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
Confidential  
~~RESTRICTED~~  
~~UNKNOWN~~

~~High~~  
Immediate  
~~Priority~~  
~~Normal~~

(Date)

3/2

Despatched

1702

CYPHER

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

~~Ex Clair.~~  
~~Code~~  
Cypher

[Security classification  
—if any]

CONFIDENTIAL

[Privacy marking  
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to TEHRAN

telegram No. 83 (date)

And to PRIORITY/BAGHDAD

repeated for information to

Saving to

Your telegram No. 100 [of 3 February]: Advise  
to British Businessmen. We do not think situation  
warrants our giving general advice to visitors to  
keep away from Iraq. We are, however, advising  
enquirers that unless they consider their visits  
essential they should consider deferring them for  
a few days.

2. Prospective visitors to Iraq are also being  
advised to notify Baghdad on arrival of their  
address in Iraq and length of stay.

Repeat to:—  
~~Priority~~  
Baghdad

Saving to:—

Distribution:—

NED  
Consular Dept.  
News Dept.  
Emergency Unit

Copies to:—

PMH H. H. H.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

XX

X

4

3/2

15252  
3/2/69



TOP COPY NE (49)

En Clair

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno. 139

3 February, 1969

UNCLASSIFIED

(47)  
Addressed to Foreign and Commonwealth Office telegram  
No. 139 of 3 February,  
Repeated for information to Tehran, Beirut.

Tehran telegram No. 100 to Foreign and Commonwealth  
Office.

We see no reason at present for British businessmen who  
have planned trips here to postpone them.

Mr. Evans

FILES  
NR. EAST. D.  
EX. PRO. DEPT.  
CONSULAR D.  
NEWS D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT:



JJJJJ

PA  
mmt sh



CYPHER/CAT.A.

SECRET

(50)  
TOP COPY

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 130

1 FEBRUARY 1969

NE

SECRET

DEDIP

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 130 OF 1  
EATED FOR INFORMATION TO STOCKHOLM.



ANGLO IRAQI RELATIONS.

ALTHOUGH THINGS HAVE SETTLED DOWN AFTER WEDNESDAY'S  
DEMONSTRATIONS, WE ARE STILL NOT OUT OF THE WOOD.  
COMMENT IN U.K. AND ELSEWHERE IS DEEPLY RESENTED  
HERE BY GOVERNMENT AND, IF PRESENT TENOR IS MAINTAINED,  
THERE IS REAL DANGER THAT IRAQIS MAY BE STUNG INTO  
SOME FURTHER ACTION. THEY WILL CERTAINLY ADMIT NO  
ERROR ON THEIR OWN PART AND MAY THUS HAVE NEED OF A SCAPE  
GOAT. (THERE WOULD BE A TENDENCY TO CHOOSE TRADITIONAL  
ONE.)

2. IN THIS SITUATION:

(A) FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST EMBASSY ARE POSSIBLE.  
THESE COULD BE MUCH MORE DANGEROUS THAN WEDNESDAY'S  
IF GOVERNMENT WERE LAXER OVER PROTECTION.

(B) IRAQIS MIGHT EVEN BREAK OFF DIPLOMATIC REL-  
ATIONS IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS COULD COME  
VERY QUICKLY EVEN OVER SOME COMPARATIVELY TRIVIAL MATTER.

/3. I

SECRET



3. I DO NOT THINK THAT THINGS WILL COME TO THIS PASS, I.E. A BREAK. IF ANYTHING, FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS ARE LIKELY TO BE ORDER OF THE DAY. BUT FROM POINT OF VIEW OF BRITISH COMMUNITY, IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT A PROTECTING POWER SHOULD BE FUNCTIONING BEFORE WE LEFT.

4. IF A BREAK WERE TO COME, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT SWEDES SHOULD AGAIN BE ASKED TO LOOK AFTER OUR INTERESTS. MAY I SUGGEST THAT AS A PRECAUTION A VERY TENTATIVE SOUNDING SHOULD BE TAKEN IN STOCKHOLM WITHOUT DELAY? JUDGING BY PAST FORM, WE MIGHT HAVE TO LEAVE AT VERY SHORT NOTICE.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO STOCKHOLM.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

MR. EVANS

FILES

HD. N. EASTERN DEPT.

HD CONSULAR DEPT.

HD EMERG. UNIT

HD. PERSONNEL DEPT.

HD E-& O DEPT.

P.S.

P.U.S.

MR. HAYMAN

MR. ARTHUR

AAAAA

SECRET

*10/11/57*



51  
TOP COPY

EN CLAIR

NEQ 3/548/1

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO BAGHDAD

TEL. NO. 101

2 FEBRUARY 1969 NE

YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT A JEWISH DEMONSTRATION IS BEING PLANNED FOR  
SUNDAY AFTERNOON AT HYDE PARK CORNER. IRAQUI EMBASSY IS NOT BEL-  
IEVED TO BE A TARGET BUT POLICE ARE ALERTED IN CASE  
DEMONSTRATORS SHOULD MAKE TROUBLE AT EMBASSY.

STEWART

FILES  
N. EAST D.  
MR. ARTHUR

AAAAA

PP  
sh



Registry No.  
DEPARTMENT



\* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should  
reach addressee(s)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

Top Secret  
Secret  
Confidential  
Restricted  
Unclassified

Flash  
Immediate  
~~Priority~~  
Routine

(Date)

2/2.

Despatched

✓ 1400

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

En Clair.  
Code  
Cypher

[Security classification  
—if any]

Unclass.

[Privacy marking  
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to

Baghdad


telegram No.

(date)

And to

repeated for information to

Saving to



Draft Telegram to:—

BAGHDAD

No. 101

(Date) 2/2

And to:—

Repeat to:—

Saving to:—

Distribution:—

files

Copies to:—

You should know that  
a Jewish demonstration is being  
planned for Sunday afternoon  
at Hyde Park Corner. Iraqi  
Embassy is not believed to  
be a target but ~~are~~ ~~are~~  
~~present~~ police ~~have been~~  
alerted in case demonstrators  
should make trouble at  
Embassy.

Att. 2/2

A.R.C.

PAAMM  
Sh

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



TOP COPY (52)

En Clair

PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO BAGHDAD

Telno 104 3 February, 1969 (NED)

UNCLASSIFIED

NEQ 3/548/1

My telegram No.101 [of 2 February] : Jewish Demonstration].

Demonstrators later went to Iraqi Embassy, having en route handed in a petition at Soviet Embassy protesting against "Soviet anti-semitism".

2. Demonstrators stood, in silence, for fifteen minutes outside Iraqi Embassy and then dispersed quietly.

STEWART

FILES

N.East. Dept.

Arab. Dept.

News Dept.

PA PLMM  
5/2

88888



Registry No. **N E D**  
DEPARTMENT

\* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s).....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

Top Secret  
~~Secret~~  
~~Confidential~~  
~~Restricted~~  
Unclassified

Flash  
Immediate }  
~~Priority~~  
~~Routine~~

(Date) 3/2

Despatched 1530

PRIVACY MARKING

~~In Confidence~~

*In Clair*  
*En Clair*  
*Code*  
*Cypher*

[Security classification  
—if any]

[Privacy marking  
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to

telegram No.

And to

repeated for information to

Saving to

Draft Telegram to:—

Baghdad

No. 104

(Date) 3/2/69

And to:—3/2/69

Repeat to:—

Saving to:—

My telegram no. 101 [of 2 February]: Jewish Demonstration.]

Demonstrators later went to Iraqi Embassy, having en route handed in a petition at Soviet Embassy protesting against "Soviet anti-semitism".

2. Demonstrators stood, in silence, for fifteen minutes outside Iraqi Embassy and then dispersed quietly.

Files.


Distribution:—

NED

Arabian Dept.

News Dept.

Copies to:—



*PMH*  
*N.E.D.*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



Anglo/Iraqi Relations; Anti-Iraqi Demonstrations In Britain; Attitude Towards Iraqi Executions; Article On Iraq In Encyclopaedia Britannica. UK Policy And Relations With Iraq. 3 Feb. 1969. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/882. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107475043/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=3362b713&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107475043/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=3362b713&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.